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Periodic introductions of influenza A viruses (IAVs) from wild birds contribute to
emergence of novel strains that infect domestic poultry, lower mammals, and humans,
but the mechanisms of emergence are unclear. The objectives of this dissertation research
are to infer the genesis of two emerging IAVs, low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI)
H10N8 and highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H7N8 viruses, and to characterize
the antigenic diversity and genetic evolution of contemporary H7 avian influenza viruses
(AIVs) from North America.
First, AIVs that are genetically close to the human H10N8 isolate were recovered
at the live poultry market (LPM) visited by the first H10N8 patient. High seroprevalence
of H10 virus was observed in ducks and chickens from five LPMs in the region. These
findings suggested that LPM was the most probable source of human infection with the
H10N8 virus, and this virus appeared to be present throughout the LPM system in the
city.
Second, the novel H7N8 virus most likely circulated among diving ducks in the
Mississippi flyway during autumn 2015 and was subsequently introduced to Indiana

turkey, in which it evolved from LPAI into HPAI. H4N8 IAVs from diving ducks possess
a gene constellation comprising five H7N8–like gene segments. These findings suggest
that viral gene constellations circulating among diving ducks could contribute towards
the emergence of IAVs that can affect poultry. Diving ducks may serve as a unique
reservoir, contributing to the maintenance, diversification, and transmission of IAVs in
wild birds.
Third, antigenic and genetic characterization of 93 H7 AIVs from North America
showed limited antigenic diversity. Gradual accumulation of nucleotide and amino acid
substitutions in the H7 gene of AIVs from wild and domestic birds caused a wide genetic
diversity. These findings suggested that continuous genetic evolution has not led to
significant antigenic diversity for contemporary H7 AIVs isolated from wild and
domestic birds in North America.
In summary, these findings not only improve our understanding of the ecology
and evolution of IAVs but also provide information for formulation of effective disease
prevention and control strategies.
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INTRODUCTION
The Biology of Influenza A Virus
Emerging infectious diseases can be defined as “infections that have newly
appeared in a population or have existed previously but are rapidly increasing in
incidence or geographic range” (1). Among many infectious agents, few have as
profound effect on humans as influenza viruses (2).
Influenza viruses belong to the Orthomyxoviridae family and are enveloped,
single-stranded, negative sense RNA viruses containing seven to eight gene segments (3,
4). Influenza viruses are categorized into four distinct serotypes, A, B, C, and D on the
basis of antigenic difference in the nucleoprotein (NP) and matrix (M1) protein (5).
Among them, serotype A is the most important one due to its wide host range (4).
Serotype B, C, and D are reported to infect only mammals (6-8).
The genome of influenza A virus (IAV) comprises eight RNA gene segments
(segment one to eight) with varying lengths of 890–2,341 nucleotides. These gene
segments encode at least 11 proteins: polymerase basic 2 (PB2), polymerase basic 1
(PB1) and polymerase basic 1 - Frame 2 (PB1-F2), polymerase acidic (PA),
hemagglutinin (HA), NP, neuraminidase (NA), matrix (M) 1 and 2, and nonstructural
(NS) 1 and 2 proteins are encoded by gene segments one to eight, respectively. IAV
contains a host cell-derived lipid membrane, which is embedded with three virus proteins,
1

HA, NA, and M2. An inner coat comprised of the M1 protein is found underlying the
membrane. Nucleocapsid of the viral genome lies at the center of the virus. Each of eight
gene segments is encapsidated by multiple NP proteins to form a nucleocapsid, while
three polymerase proteins (PB2, PB1, and PA) sit at the end of the nucleocapsid (4, 9,
10). IAVs could be further divided into distinct subtypes on the basis of the antigenicity
of two surface glycoproteins, HA and NA. To date, 18 HA and 11 NA subtypes have
been reported (11).
Impacts of Influenza Disease Caused by IAVs
IAVs present a typical one-health challenge, where human health and animal
health meet and influence each other (4). IAVs infecting humans could cause both global
pandemic and seasonal epidemic. The occasional influenza pandemic could infect 20% to
40% of the world population and cause a significant number of deaths (12). For example,
the 1918 influenza pandemic was considered one of the most devastating infectious
diseases in human history and it was estimated to have claimed at least 50 million human
lives around the world (13, 14). In addition to sporadic pandemic outbreaks, the seasonal
epidemic causes a number of morbidity and mortality in humans worldwide annually,
including an average of more than 200,000 hospitalizations and 23,000 deaths in the
United States alone (15, 16). The direct medical cost associated with seasonal influenza
in the United States averages over ten billion US dollars annually (17).
The diseases caused by IAV infection among domestic poultry include
asymptomatic infections, mild to severe respiratory disease, and severe disease with high
morbidity and mortality. On the basis of virulence in chicken, avian influenza viruses
(AIVs) could be divided into two groups: highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) and
2

low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI). HPAI could cause devastating disease among
domestic poultry and the mortality may be as high as 100%. HPAI viruses are associated
with direct and indirect losses that may be incurred by the poultry industry through
mortality of affected birds, culling of flocks to prevent spread, trade restrictions imposed
of detection, and increased costs associated with outbreak response. For example, 17
HPAI outbreaks were reported among domestic poultry worldwide during 1955-2000,
including six outbreaks among domestic turkey and 11 outbreaks among domestic
chicken (18). Among them, seven outbreaks caused more than 100,000 birds affection or
depopulation. In 2003, 255 poultry flocks in the Netherlands was affected by HPAI
H7N7 virus and it has led to the death or culling of more than 30 million birds (19). The
HPAI outbreak among domestic poultry caused by H5 AIVs in the northwestern and midwestern United States in 2015 led to depopulation of more than 48 million birds
(https://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/animal_health/2015/fs-hpai-vaccine-use.pdf).
AIV, such as the HPAI H5N1 virus, could also transmit from birds to humans and
cause fatal disease. In spring of 1996, the precursor of currently circulating HPAI H5N1
viruses was identified in farmed geese in Guangdong, China; the mortality caused by the
virus among geese was about 40%. Outbreaks among chicken were detected in Hong
Kong one year later and led to depopulation of about 1.5 million birds. The first case of
human infection with the H5N1 virus was reported in May 1997; H5N1 virus strain was
isolated from a boy died of respiratory illness in Hong Kong (20). 17 additional cases of
human infection with H5N1 viruses were reported in Hong Kong in November and
December of the same year and five cases were fatal. In March 1999, H5N1 viruses were
isolated from environmental samples collected from cages that housed geese in Hong
3

Kong (21). In 2003, fatal human infections with H5N1 virus were reported for the first
time after the outbreak in Hong Kong in 1997 (22). Since December 2003, HPAI H5N1
virus has caused outbreaks among domestic poultry and repeated zoonotic transmissions
in Asia (23-26). In May 2005, HPAI H5N1 virus were detected among migratory birds at
Qinghai Lake, China (27) and were subsequently found to spread to Europe, the Middle
East, and Africa (28, 29). To date, the HPAI H5N1 virus has cause more than 800
laboratory-confirmed human cases worldwide, including over 400 deaths
(http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/H5N1_cumulative_table_archive
s/en/).
Ecology of IAVs
IAVs exist in a complex ecosystem that involves various hosts, including humans,
swine, equine, canine, sea mammals, and numerous wild and domestic birds (4, 9, 30).
Wild Birds
The first isolation of IAV from wild bird was reported in 1961 (31). A HPAI
strain, A/tern/South Africa/61(H5N3), was isolated from a common tern in South Africa;
and this virus caused infection among 1,300 common terns (18, 31). LPAI strains have
been isolated from wild waterfowl since the mid-1970s (30-32). World-wide, LPAI
viruses have been recovered from at least 105 wild bird species representing 26 different
taxonomic families (33). Most of the 26 families are in the Order Anseriformes, followed
by the Order Charadriiformes; birds in these two orders include ducks, geese, and swans,
and shorebirds, gulls, and terns, respectively, which are considered major natural
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reservoirs for IAVs (4, 33, 34). IAVs representing 16 HA and 9 NA subtypes have been
identified in wild birds throughout the world (33).
In North America, the southern migration of birds begins as early as August for
some species, and in later September, October, and early November for most species. The
highest prevalence of IAVs is found in dabbling ducks, particular mallards, which have
been the most extensively studied bird species in the ecosystem of IAVs (33). The
prevalence of IAVs in mallards fluctuates during the bird migration cycle. Influenza
prevalence could reach as high as 60% among the mallards sampled in the breeding areas
in Canada prior to the migration in early fall (35). Influenza prevalence falls to less than
2% by the time when mallards reach the wintering ground in lower Mississippi and
Louisiana usually around December and January of the following year. Influenza virus
were brought back by mallards to the breeding areas in Canada in spring, although the
prevalence may fall to as low as 0.25% (4).
The infectious pattern of IAVs in shorebirds and gulls is different from that in
waterfowl in the following two major aspects. First, the highest prevalence of IAVs in
shorebirds and gulls is usually found in the later spring and early summer (4, 36).
Shorebirds and gulls are proposed to bring the virus back to the northern breeding area
(36). Thus, shorebirds and gulls may contribute to the overwinter maintenance and longterm persistence of IAVs in wild birds. Second, in addition to H1 to H12, IAVs of the
subtype H13 and H16 were primarily isolated from shorebirds and gulls (33, 37, 38).
Substantial difference was observed between the genomic sequences of the H13 and H16
gene segments and those of other subtypes, suggest the long time isolation of IAVs of
these two HA subtypes in shorebirds and gulls (37).
5

The infection caused by most IAV strains in wild birds is asymptomatic, which
may due to the long-term adaptation of IAVs in these birds (4). In wild birds, IAVs
replicate mainly in the intestinal tract and are excreted in high level in the feces (39, 40).
For example, a study in 1978 showed that the load of influenza virus in the feces of
mallards could be up to 108.7 50% egg infectious doses per gram (40). In addition,
influenza virus could remain infectious for over 30 days in water at 0 degree Celsius (oC)
and four days at 22 oC (40, 41). Wild waterfowl shed virus into the water through feces
and fecal-oral route is considered the major way for the transmission of IAVs between
waterfowls (4, 9).
The genetic pool of IAVs is divided into two major independently evolving
lineages, Eurasian and American, probably due to geographical separation of host species
(42-44). The migration of birds between different continents allows the occasional gene
flow between these two genetic pools (45). For example, Beringian Crucible is
recognized as a common breeding grounds shared by migratory birds from Eurasia and
America. Early research showed that around 1.5 to 2.9 million birds migrate from Asia to
Alaska annually (46). A 2008 study characterized 38 IAVs isolated from Alaska and
found that nearly half (44.7%) possess at least one gene segment more closely related to
those recovered from Eurasia instead of those from North America (47). Evidence for
intercontinental gene flow was also observed in another study of 25 IAVs isolated from
North America, among them, five isolates have two Eurasian origin gene segments and
20 isolates have one Eurasian origin gene segment (48). In addition, there were evidences
showing that Eurasian origin H6 IAVs invaded the North American wild bird population
and caused outbreaks among domestic poultry in California during 2000-2002 (49, 50).
6

Domestic Poultry
Through migration, wild birds can carry IAVs from one area to another and
present risks to the host species along the migratory flyway, including domestic poultry,
lower mammals, and humans. Frequent introductions of wild bird-origin IAVs to
domestic poultry have been well-documented. In Minnesota alone during 1978-2000,
there were at least 108 laboratory-confirmed introductions of influenza viruses from wild
birds to domestic poultry (51). The direct transmission of IAVs from migratory birds to
range-reared turkey was recognized as a major source of IAV outbreaks among domestic
turkey in the United States; and this dynamic was also suggested to contribute to the IAV
outbreaks among chickens (52). Alternatively, range-reared domestic ducks and geese
could serve as intermediate hosts that bridge the ecological gap between wild birds and
domestic chickens and turkeys.
Following introduction to domestic poultry, IAVs could cause disease and
circulate in domestic poultry for a long time (30, 53); and AIVs of two HA subtypes, H5
and H7, are known to could give rise to HPAI virus. HPAI virus was historically known
as fowl plague, which was reported for the first time among chickens in Italy in 1878 (18,
54). The virus was later isolated in 1902, A/Chicken/Brescia/1902(H7N7). Fowl plague
was classified as IAV in 1955 and referred to HPAI ever since (18). The major difference
in the pathogenicity of HPAI and LPAI viruses is their ability to cause systemic
replication in the host. The cleavability of the HA protein is one of the major
determinants of the tissue tropism of AIVs (55). The HA protein of HPAI virus can be
cleaved by a broad range of enzymes that present in most cells of the body and caused
systemic infection. In contrast, the HA protein of LPAI virus can only be cleaved by
7

trypsin-like proteases and infection is restricted in the respiratory or intestinal tract (56).
The presence of multiple basic amino acids in the cleavage region of the HA protein is
the major molecular feature for HPAI strains.
Seventeen HPAI outbreaks were reported among domestic poultry worldwide
during 1955-2000 (18). HPAI outbreaks among domestic poultry were also reported in
multiple countries after the year 2000. For example, during 2003-2008, HPAI H5N1
virus was reported in at least ten countries in East and Southeast Asia, including China,
Japan, South Korea, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, and
Vietnam (57). Outside of the region, HPAI H5N1 virus were reported in multiple
countries in Middle East, Europe, and Africa, including Israel, Iraq, Russia, United
Kingdom, Germany, France, Egypt, and Nigeria (58, 59). Detection of HPAI H7 viruses
were reported in Chile (H7N3, 2002) (60), the Netherlands (H7N7, 2003) (19), Canada
(H7N3, 2004 and 2007) (61, 62), and Mexico (H7N3, 2012) (63, 64).
In January 2014, a novel Eurasian lineage clade 2.3.4.4 HPAI H5N8 virus was
detected in wild bird and domestic poultry in South Korea (65), and was subsequently
detected in China and Japan (66). Since November 2014, the novel HPAI H5N8 virus has
been detected in wild bird and domestic poultry in multiple countries in Europe,
including Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Italy,
(http://www.oie.int/en/animal-health-in-the-world/update-on-avian-influenza/2014/). In
December 2014, HPAI H5N8 virus was first detected in wild bird in the United States
(67). Two novel reassortant viruses of the subtype H5N1 and H5N2 have been isolated
from wild bird and domestic poultry in the United States and Canada since December
2014 (68-71). The HPAI H5 outbreaks caused depopulation of approximately 7.5 million
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turkeys and 42.1 million chickens in the United States
(https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/hpai/lan
dfillsandhpairesponse.pdf).
Swine
The infection of influenza virus in swine was first clinically recognized in 1918 in
the United States, which overlaps the time period of the 1918 influenza pandemic (72).
The first swine influenza virus (SIV) was isolated in 1930 (73, 74); this virus, refers to
the classical swine H1N1 virus, has continued to circulate and cause diseases in swine
population worldwide. The classical swine H1N1 virus was found to be predominant in
the North American swine population until the mid-1990s (75-77); however, this trend
changed dramatically with the emergence and establishment of the triple reassortant SIVs
of the subtypes H1N2 and H3N2 since 1998 (78-80). The eight gene segments of the
triple reassortant SIVs were derived from multiple sources, including the classical swine
H1N1, human H3N2, and avian origin IAVs (78, 79). In addition, introduction of AIVs to
swine population has been frequently reported. For example, an avian like H1N1 IAVs
emerged and led to enzootic disease in the European swine population since 1979 (8183). In China, serological surveillance results suggested the prevalence of avian origin
H3, H4 and H6 IAVs in the swine population (84). Introduction of avian origin H1N1
IAV to swine was reported in Hong Kong in 1993 (85). There were also reported
sporadic cases of avian origin IAVs infection in swine, including H4N1 (86), H4N8 (87),
H5N1 (88), H6N6 (89, 90), H9N2 (91), and H10N5 viruses (92).
Swine are suggested to play an important role in the ecology of IAVs. The cell of
swine respiratory tract possesses receptors recognized by both avian (sialic acid α2,3
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galactose, SA2,3Gal) and human (SA2,6Gal) IAVs (93), and this provides the biological
basis for the susceptibility of swine to both avian and human IAVs. Thus, swine is
proposed to function as the intermediate hosts, or mixing vessels, for the generation of
pandemic strains, including both the 1957 and 1968 pandemic virus (94). The emergence
of the 2009 pandemic virus provided further evidence supporting this hypothesis (95);
and this virus will be described in the next section.
Humans
The introduction of avian origin influenza gene(s) to influenza viruses that
circulating in humans has been associated with the emergence of four documented
pandemic strains, including 1918 H1N1, 1957 H2N2, 1968 H3N2, and 2009 H1N1
viruses (95-98).
The 1918 influenza pandemic emerged and swept globally since September, 1918
(13, 99). The origin of the 1918 H1N1 virus remained controversial and probably could
never be resolved (12, 100). Although no virus was isolated prior or during the 1918
influenza pandemic, genetic analysis of the reconstructed genome of 1918 H1N1 virus in
the 1990s showed that the virus was probably an avian like influenza virus (101). There
are still a few key questions not answered, including the origin host of the virus and the
potential existence of an intermediate host (12, 13). In contrast to the HPAI viruses,
multiple basic amino acids were not observed at the cleavage site of the HA protein of the
1918 H1N1 virus (102, 103).
The 1957 H2N2 and 1968 H3N2 pandemic strains were both originated from
southeastern Asia. These two pandemic strains were reassortants generated through
reassortment between pre-existing human IAVs and AIVs (96-98). The PB1, HA, and
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NA gene segments of the 1957 H2N2 virus were derived from an AIV, and the remaining
five gene segments were the descendant of the 1918 H1N1 strain (97). The 1968 H3N2
virus possess two gene segments (PB1 and HA) originated from an AIV, and the
remaining six gene segments were derived from the circulating human H2N2 virus (96).
The first influenza pandemic in the 21th century occurred in 2009. A novel human
H1N1 virus was first detected in Mexico in March 2009 (104, 105) and this virus quickly
spread to the rest of the world. By July 2009, 162,300 laboratory-confirmed cases and
over 1,100 human deaths caused by the 2009 H1N1 pandemic virus were reported in 168
countries (106). The pandemic was estimated to have caused more than 123,000 deaths
around the world by the end of 2009 (107). Subsequently, the 2009 H1N1 virus started to
co-circulate with seasonal H3N2 and influenza B virus around the world (108-110).
Phylogenetic analysis results showed that the 2009 H1N1 virus was a reassortant with the
eight gene segments originated from multiple sources (95). The NA and MP gene
segments were derived from the European avian like H1N1 SIV, and the remaining six
gene segments were originated from the North American triple reassortant SIV;
specifically, the HA, NP, and NS gene segments were derived from the classical swine
H1N1 virus, PB1 gene segment was originated from seasonal H3N2 virus, and PB2 and
PA gene segments were derived from AIVs (111, 112). Each precursor gene segment of
the 2009 H1N1 virus had been circulated in the swine population for more than a decade
and the direct precursor of the virus may had emerged a few months prior to the detection
of the outbreak in humans (112, 113).
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Evolution of IAVs
IAVs are notorious for their capability of rapid evolution in response to the
adapting hosts. The evolutionary dynamics of IAVs is largely determined by rapid
mutation, frequent reassortment, and multiple selection pressures, including host immune
response and host switch (4).
Population and Quasispecies
Infection of IAV could start with a small number of virions and then generated a
large number of progeny viruses. An individually-infected cell could release more than
104 influenza viruses, although this number is subjected to variation due to difference in
host cells (114). This large number of influenza viruses exists as a quasispecies, similar to
other RNA viruses (115). Quasispecies is defined as “a cloud of diverse variants that are
genetically linked through mutation, interact cooperatively on a functional level, and
collectively contribute to the characteristics of the population” (116). Selection pressure
acts upon this whole unit rather than individual virus. In addition, the survival of a
population is not only determined by its own fitness but also its flexibility to mutate and
give rise to progenies that are more fit on average.
Evolutionary Mechanisms
There are three mechanisms that contribute to the evolution and genetic diversity
of IAVs: mutation, reassortment, and recombination.
Mutation refers to substitution, insertion, and deletion due to the intrinsic error of
the replication. Viral RNA polymerase lacks the proofreading ability and leads to the
error-prone replication of RNA viruses. The mutation rate of RNA viruses is
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approximately 10-4 mutations per nucleotide copied (117), which is significantly higher
than that of DNA viruses (10-9 mutations per nucleotide copied). Based on this mutation
rate, approximately one mutation is made across the IAV genome during one replication
cycle. Given the large population size, mutation contributes to the great genetic diversity
of IAVs.
The segmented nature of IAV genome allows exchange of individual gene
segment or combination of gene segments between IAVs during mixed infection in the
same host cell. Reassortment occurs frequently between IAVs and permits rapid
generation of progeny viruses with gene segment combination significantly different
from that of the parental viruses (48, 118, 119). Reassortment enhances the genetic
diversity of IAV, in turn, this increased diversity may facilitate the generation of novel
pandemic and epidemic strains. Reassortment has been associated with the emergence of
at least three out of four documented pandemic strains as described earlier, including
1957 H2N2, 1968 H3N2, and 2009 H1N1 viruses (95, 96). Moreover, genome-scale
evolutionary study showed high degree of reassortment and periodic genome-wide
sweeps for the H3N2 seasonal influenza virus (120, 121).
Recombination refers to the exchange of pieces of genetic information between
RNA molecules during replication and leads to the production of a RNA molecule with
mixed ancestry. Recombination that occurs between regions with high sequence identity
is referred as homologous, while recombination between two genetically different regions
or non-related RNA molecules is referred as non-homologous. Early study with genomic
dataset of human IAV showed that homologous recombination, if occurring at all, is very
rare (122). On the other hand, non-homologous recombination has been reported and
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associated with increased pathogenicity of a few AIV strains. The HA gene segment of
the HPAI H7N3 viruses isolated during the outbreak in Chile (2002) and Canada (2004)
obtained multi-basic amino acids at the cleavage region through non-homologous
recombination with NP (60) and MP (123) gene segment, respectively. In addition, HPAI
H7N3 virus isolated during the outbreak in Mexico (2012) obtained insert at the HA
cleavage region through non-homologous recombination with host genomes (63).
Selection Pressure
Mutation, reassortment, and recombination lead to great genetic diversity of
IAVs. This increased genetic diversity provides a platform for selection pressure to select
for or against.
Immune Pressure
Although multiple selection pressures were suggested to determine the long-term
success of any lineage of IAV, host immune pressure is considered to play a critical role.
IAVs could escape the host immune response through its antigenic evolution known as
antigenic drift and antigenic shift. Two surface glycoproteins, HA and NA, are the
primary targets of the humoral immune response. Accumulation of point mutations
within antibody-binding sites in HA and/or NA proteins can lead to a small antigenic
change, so called antigenic drift. The switch of HA and/or NA gene segment by
reassortment can cause a large antigenic change, so called antigenic shift.
In wild birds, IAVs are proposed to have reached evolutionary stasis and
maintained a stable antigenic status (4). For example, a study in 1987 showed that H3
AIVs isolated from mallards within the Pacific flyway during 1977-1985 are highly
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conserved in antigenic properties (124). Similar to that, a limited antigenic diversity was
found among 37 H3 AIV strains isolated from migratory birds from Atlantic, Central,
Mississippi, and Pacific flyways during 2007-2011 (125). Another study found that
antigenic difference among 26 H7 AIVs isolated from shorebirds and gulls at Delaware
Bay was within 2-fold change in the hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays; among the
26 isolates, 24 are of the subtype H7N3, one of subtype H7N4 and one of subtype H7N5
(38). The same study also observed that four mallard-origin H5 AIVs isolated from
Sweden and the Netherlands in 1999 and 2002 showed antigenic differences of less than
4-fold change in HI assays.
Probably due to the selection pressure from host immune response and/or host
adaptation, the HA protein of IAVs were found to evolve faster in a few species, inducing
humans (126), swine (127), and domestic poultry (128, 129). In humans, there are two
subtypes of seasonal IAVs, H1N1 and H3N2 viruses. Seasonal H3N2 IAV originated
from the 1968 pandemic strain and has continued to circulate ever since. Seasonal H3N2
IAV has undergone considerable antigenic evolution and 11 distinct antigenic clusters
were observed during 1968-2003 (130). Antigenic drift between different clusters could
be caused by single and multiple amino acid substitutions in the HA protein; and 39
antigenicity associated sites were identified (131). The history of seasonal H1N1 IAV
could date back to the 1918 pandemic and it had circulated among humans until replaced
by H2N2 virus in 1957 (96, 132, 133). During the post-pandemic period, a major
antigenic change was reported in 1947 (134). After 20 years of being undetected, H1N1
virus which is identical to that from the 1950s re-emerged in 1977 (135, 136) and has
been co-circulating with H3N2 virus ever since. Compared to the rapid evolution
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demonstrated by seasonal H3N2 IAV, H1N1 virus showed less frequent antigenic drifts
(137). In addition to mutations at the antibody binding sites, the change in antigenicity of
H1N1 virus was associated with glycosylation in the globular head of the HA protein
(138).
Antigenic drift has also been reported for IAVs that infect swine. For example,
antigenic variants of classical H1N1 SIVs were reported in the United States during
1992-1994 (139-141). H1N1 SIVs isolated from the North American swine population
were divided into multiple antigenic clusters, inducing α, β, γ, δ-1, and δ-2 (142). Similar
to that, at least two distinct antigenic clusters, H3N2 SIV-alpha and H3N2 SIV-beta, were
identified in the H3N2 SIVs that circulate among the swine population in the United
States during 2006-2012 (143). In Europe, antigenic drift was reported for the H3N2
SIVs from multiple countries in the 1990s, including the Netherlands and Belgium (144),
and Italy (145).
Host Switch
IAVs present partial restriction in terms of host range with occurrences of
interspecies transmission. HA glycoprotein is considered the major determinant for host
range due to its role in recognition of and binding to the host cell receptor (9). HAs of
human IAVs prefer to bind to SA2,6Gal, whereas those of AIVs preferentially bind to
SA2,3Gal. Amino acid mutations in the receptor binding site could confer the change in
receptor binding specificity, and specific mutations vary among the HAs of different
viruses. For example, amino acid mutations Q226L and G228S (H3 numbering) are
linked with increased binding affinity to SA2,6Gal for human H2 and H3 IAVs (146,
147). Amino acid mutations E190D and G225D (H3 numbering) are crucial for increased
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binding affinity to SA2,6Gal for H1 IAVs infecting humans and swine (148). In addition
to the HA gene segment, molecular features associated with host switch were identified
in other gene segments. For example, approximately 20 amino acids deletion in the stalk
region of NA protein is considered one characteristic feature in the host switch of AIVs
from waterfowl to domestic poultry (149, 150); and this molecular feature could be a
compensatory change to maintain the functional compatibility between HA and NA
proteins (151). Molecular changes in the genes that code polymerase proteins, including
E627K and D701N substitutions in PB2 gene segment, could be associated with
increased replication ability in the cells of new hosts (152-155).
Vaccination
Vaccination is considered one of the primary options to prevent and control
influenza outbreaks among humans. The World Health Organization (WHO) Influenza
Program was established to address the threat brought to public health by influenza since
1948 (156, 157). Vaccine against influenza A and B viruses were invented in the 1940s
(158). The trivalent inactivated vaccine was developed after the 1968 influenza pandemic
(159). Currently, the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System comprises
more than 100 national influenza centers and six collaborating centers around the world
(160). A large number of influenza samples were collected and analyzed through this
network on a yearly basis. Recommendation of the viral seed strain in the vaccine for the
upcoming influenza season was made on the basis of antigenic, genetic, and
epidemiological data. The vaccine seed strain is determined to be updated when there is
significant antigenic difference between the existing vaccine strain and the emerging
strain; and the emerging strain may cause human infections in a wide geographic region.
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The WHO consultation is head twice a year, every February for the upcoming Northern
hemisphere influenza season and every September for the upcoming Southern
hemisphere influenza season, respectively. The trivalent vaccines are recommended to
contain two influenza A strains and one influenza B strain; and the quadrivalent vaccines
are recommended to include an additional influenza B strain.
Although the existing WHO influenza surveillance program is considered one of
the best-developed systems for infectious disease, it still has several shortcomings. First,
the selection of vaccine seed strain is based on the prediction of the predominant viral
strain for the upcoming influenza season; however, a new antigenic variant could emerge
and quickly spread after recommendation of the vaccine seed strain is made. Second,
ferret sera were used for antigenic characterization in the existing system, and this may
have limitation in accurately predicting vaccination-induced responses in humans (161163). This was shown by the poor performance of the 2014-2015 Northern Hemisphere
influenza vaccines attributed to a mismatch of H3N2 vaccine component with epidemic
strains in circulation (161). Third, the existing system mainly consider the two surface
glycoproteins, HA and NA; however, genome wide interaction may contribute to the
evolutionary dynamics of seasonal influenza virus (120). Fourth, antigenic
characterization through current laboratory methods is relatively time-consuming, hence,
only a relatively small number of influenza samples can be antigenically characterized.
The conventional strategy for controlling the spread of avian influenza outbreaks
among domestic poultry involves enforcement of biosecurity measures, diagnostics and
surveillance, and culling of infected birds. Culling of infected birds is one of the
conventional approaches to control the HPAI outbreaks. The strategies for control of
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LPAI outbreaks vary from no action to active eradication programs including culling of
infected birds. In addition to these conventional methods, vaccination programs have
been implemented in multiple countries to control AIV outbreaks among domestic
poultry. In North America, vaccine program against AIV was introduced in 1995 to
control the HPAI H5N2 virus in Mexico (164); vaccine was used against a 2003 H7N2
AIV outbreak in Connecticut, the United States, and against the on-going H7N3 AIV
outbreak in Mexico. In Eurasia, vaccine has been used in Pakistan since 1995 to control
H7N3 virus; vaccine was used against H7N1 virus in 2000 and against H7N3 virus in
2002 in Italy. Vaccination program against LPAI H9N2 virus has been implemented in
China since 1998. Vaccination program against HPAI H5N1 virus was initially
implemented in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China in 2012. Afterwards,
more than 113 billion doses of vaccine have been used against HPAI H5N1 virus in 14
countries during 2002-2010. Nationwide vaccination programs were carried out in China,
Vietnam, Indonesia, and Egypt, all of which account for 99% of the vaccine used against
HPAI H5N1 virus (165). The use of vaccine can reduce or prevent clinical disease;
reduce or eliminate virus shedding into the environment from infected birds, which
would help prevent the spread of virus to uninfected flocks; and increase the resistance of
birds to becoming infected. Early experience showed that vaccination program could
serve as a valuable component in a successful AIV control strategy.
The implementation of vaccination program has been associated with the
antigenic evolution of AIVs circulating among domestic poultry. For instance,
vaccination program was suggested to facilitate the genetic evolution of HPAI H5 viruses
circulating among domestic poultry; a 2011 study showed that HA gene of HPAI H5N1
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virus isolated from countries where vaccination was implemented genetically evolved
faster than those from countries where vaccination was not implemented (166). In
addition, vaccination program has been associated with the antigenic evolution of HPAI
H5N2 virus in Mexico. Vaccination program was introduced to control the HPAI H5N2
outbreak among domestic chicken in 1995 (167). After that, two novel genetic lineages
emerged; viruses in these two lineages underwent antigenic drift and acquired a more
than 4-fold antigenic difference from the vaccine strain (168). Moreover, antigenic
characterization of 41 H7N3 AIV strains isolated during the 2002-2004 epidemic in Italy
showed significant antigenic difference between the viruses isolated prior to the
implementation of vaccination program and those after the vaccination program (169).
Knowledge Gaps and Objectives of this Dissertation
Collectively, periodic introductions of IAVs from wild birds contribute to the
emergence of novel strains that cause infections in humans, lower mammals, and
domestic poultry. Vaccination is considered one of the primary options to prevent and
control human influenza outbreaks; and vaccination program could also contribute to a
successful AIV control strategy. Antigenic match between vaccine seed strain and
circulating viral strains is one of the keys to a successful influenza vaccination program.
Thus, it is critical to characterize the genesis of emerging avian origin IAVs and
understand the antigenic diversity of contemporary IAVs. Such analyses could provide
important information for formulation of effective disease control and prevention
strategies. Although our understanding has been greatly improved, there are a few
questions not addressed regarding the antigenic and genetic evolution of emerging avian
origin IAVs.
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First, a novel LPAI H10N8 virus emerged and caused three human infections in
Jiangxi, China since December 2013 (170). Genetic analysis showed that the novel virus
was a reassortant with HA and NA gene segments originating from wild bird origin IAVs
and the six internal gene segments from the H9N2 virus circulating among domestic
poultry in the region. However, the source of human infection with the H10N8 virus was
not determined.
Southern China is hypothesized to be an influenza epicenter (171), and the
emergence and zoonotic transmission of novel AIVs were favored by a unique set of
ecological conditions, including the large domestic duck population and the widespread
live poultry market (LPM) system (172-175). The threat brought by the ecosystem in the
region was repeatedly demonstrated by the emergence and zoonotic transmission of
H5N1, H9N2, and H7N9 viruses (20, 176, 177).
LPMs have been recognized as playing an important role in the epidemiology of
IAVs (173, 178, 179). LPMs host various avian species from different sources in a dense
environment and serve as an optimal site for maintenance and diversification of influenza
virus. For example, LPAI H5N2 viruses had been isolated from LPMs in the United
States during 1986–1989 (178, 180). LPAI H7N2 virus was first identified in the LPMs
in the Northeast United States in 1994, and it has been continued to circulate until 2006
(129, 181). Evidence for reassortment of H7N2 AIVs with other AIVs circulating in the
LPMs was observed. In addition, LPMs provide an environment for contact between
humans and infected live animals, which allows the potential zoonotic transmission of
AIVs. The association between LPMs and zoonotic transmission was suggested by the
earlier human infections of HPAI H5N1 and LPAI H9N2 viruses (182-184). In March
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2013, a novel LPAI H7N9 virus emerged in eastern China (177) and has become enzootic
in the region. Since the emergence of H7N9 virus, more than 500 laboratory-confirmed
cases in human have been reported, of which more than 100 were fatal
(http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/influenza_h7n9/en/). LPM was
identified as the most probable source of human infections with H7N9 virus (177, 185).
This was further supported by the evidence showing temporally closure of LPMs in
major Chinese cities after the initial outbreak of H7N9 virus significantly reduced the
number of human infections (186, 187). We hypothesized that LPM is the source of
H10N8 human infections.
Second, the emergence of HPAI viruses in domestic poultry has been associated
with introductions of LPAI viruses from wild birds, but the mechanisms of emergence are
unclear. In January 2016, a novel HPAI H7N8 virus emerged and caused high mortality
among turkey flock in Indiana, United States. The genesis of this H7N8 virus is not
understood.
Following introductions into domestic poultry, LPAI H5 and H7 viruses have the
potential to evolve into HPAI viruses through two mechanisms: 1) acquisition of basic
amino acids in the cleavage region of the HA protein by insertion or substitution (188),
and 2) recombination with another gene segment(s) or host genome (60, 63, 123). HPAI
viruses are of concern because of the direct and indirect losses that may be incurred by
the poultry industry through mortality of affected birds, culling of flocks to prevent
spread, trade restrictions, and increased costs associated with outbreak response.
The consequences of introductions of IAVs from wild birds to domestic poultry
has been repeatedly demonstrated by the emergence of novel HPAIs in Eurasia, including
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H5N1 (20), H7N1 (189), and H7N7 viruses (19). In the Americas, HPAI H5 viruses
caused outbreaks among domestic poultry in 1983 (190), 1994 (191), and 2014 and 2015
(71). In addition to subtype H5 viruses, HPAI H7 viruses have been frequently reported
in the Americas. There were four reported HPAI H7N3 outbreaks between 2002 and
present: one outbreak in Chile (2002) (60), two distinct outbreaks in Canada (2004 and
2007) (61, 62), and one outbreak in Mexico (2012). In addition to affect domestic
poultry, HPAIs H5N1, H7N3 (Canada in 2004 and Mexico in 2012), and H7N7 viruses
also caused human infections (20, 64, 192, 193).
Retrospective studies have often been conducted to determine the putative
precursor viruses leading to the emergence of IAV strains that cause outbreak among
domestic poultry. Wild birds have been recognized as the most probable source for
outbreak strains or at least a few of the gene segments that were incorporated into the
genome of the outbreak strains (194, 195). However, in many instances, evidence is
lacking regarding the time of emergence, location of reassortment, and bird species
associated with the genesis of a particular IAV outbreak strain; limited availability of
contemporary wild bird-origin IAV isolates or sequences impedes any attempt to
investigate the potential mechanisms underlying the emergence.
We hypothesized that 1) the H7N8 virus identified in turkeys in Indiana was
initially introduced from wild birds and developed high pathogenicity within poultry
production systems; 2) genetic analysis of a large number of available contemporary wild
bird–origin IAV isolates would indicate what wild bird species and IAVs contributed to
the emergence of the HPAI H7N8 virus.
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Third, earlier studies showed minor antigenic diversity for H7 AIVs isolated from
wild birds in Eurasia (195, 196); however, limited data is available for antigenic diversity
of contemporary H7 AIVs from North America. H7 AIVs present a continuous threat to
both public and animal health. Vaccination program is considered a useful component of
a successful control strategy against AIV and has been implemented in multiple
countries. Because IAVs frequently undergo antigenic change, circulating influenza
strains should be continually monitored to optimize the antigenic matches between
vaccine seed strain and circulating strains. Thus, understating the antigenic diversity of
contemporary H7 AIVs is crucial for a successful vaccination program.
The objectives of this dissertation research were to infer the genesis of two
emerging avian origin IAVs, LPAI H10N8 and HPAI H7N8 viruses, and to investigate
the antigenic diversity and genetic evolution of H7 AIVs from North America. The
overall hypotheses of this dissertation were: 1) genetically, a persistent gene constellation
of IAVs circulating among wild birds favors the emergence of novel IAVs that cause
outbreaks among domestic poultry and human; 2) antigenically, IAVs have reached a
point of stasis in wild birds but not in domestic poultry. To validate the hypotheses, four
specific objectives were proposed.
First, develop and validate a web-based pipeline for analyzing and assembling
next generation sequencing (NGS) data for influenza viruses.
Second, characterize the genesis of a novel LPAI H10N8 virus and identify the
source of H10N8 human infection in China.
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Third, characterize the genesis of a novel HPAI H7N8 virus and recover the
evolutionary pathway leading to the outbreak of disease among domestic turkey in
Indiana, the United States.
Last, characterize the antigenic diversity and genetic evolution of contemporary
H7 AIVs isolated from North American wild and domestic birds during 1971-2012.
Dissertation Organization
This dissertation is organized into six chapters. Chapter I introduces the
background of IAVs and states the hypotheses, and objectives of this dissertation
research. A web-based pipeline for analyzing and assembling NGS data for influenza
viruses is presented in Chapter II. Chapter III investigates the genesis of a novel LPAI
H10N8 virus that emerged and caused three human infections in China, 2013. Study in
chapter IV investigates the potential origins, evolutionary pathways, and introduction
routes of a novel HPAI H7N8 virus that caused disease outbreak among turkey flocks in
Indiana, the United States, 2016. Chapter V describes the antigenic diversity and genetic
evolution of contemporary H7 AIVs from North America. Conclusions of this
dissertation study are provided in chapter VI.
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A WEB-BASED PIPELINE FOR
ANALYZING AND ASSEMBLING NGS DATA OF IAVS
NGS has become a routine method in influenza virus research. To date, there is a
lack of publically available pipelines for analyzing and assembling NGS data of influenza
virus. There are two major challenges for development of such a pipeline: rapid
identification of eight optimal reference sequences from a large influenza database
corresponding to eight gene segments in the influenza genome; determination of the
origin of short reads and assembly of homologous genomic sequences in mixed infection
sample. In this chapter, a web-based pipeline for analyzing and assembling NGS data of
influenza viruses is developed and validated. This pipeline could be applied to evaluate
the quality of NGS data, to identify the eight suitable reference sequences for influenza
genome, to assemble the full genome, and to evaluate whether there is a mixed infection
of multiple IAVs in the sample. In addition, the web-based application provides a userfriendly graphic interface and visualization for users. This pipeline is comparable in
performance to the commercially available software represented by CLC Genomics
Workbench but enabled the genomic analysis and assembly of influenza NGS data in a
high throughput manner.
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Introduction
The availability of NGS technology has allowed us to rapidly sequence influenza
genomes; and NGS has become a routine method in molecular diagnosis, surveillance,
vaccine strain selection, and laboratory research for influenza viruses. The NGS data are
characterized by high throughput of relative short reads. For example, the read length is
usually less than 300 bp for NGS data generated by Illumina. The challenge in NGS data
analyses is to accurately assemble these short reads into the IAV genomic sequences and
still represent the polymorphisms of these sequences.
To date, there still lacks of publically available pipelines for analyzing and
assembling NGS data of influenza virus. Influenza virus genome is comprised of eight
single strand negative-sense RNA gene segments, and thus genomic assembly will
require eight closely matched reference sequences. Moreover, influenza virus assembly
could be impeded by the mixed infection of multiple influenza viruses in the sample.
Considering the relative conservation of influenza gene segments, especially six internal
gene segments, it is not a trivial task to differentiate the origin of short reads and then
assembly them into homologous genomic sequences.
The objective of this chapter is to develop and validate a web-based pipeline for
analyzing and assembling NGS data for influenza viruses. The pipeline is designed to
aggregate a series of existing computational tools for NGS data preprocessing, template
matching, and genomic assembly, enabling the assembly of influenza genome and the
detection of mixed infection in a high throughput manner. The web-based application is
expected to provide user-friendly interface and visualization for the users.
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Materials and Methods
Data Preprocessing
The designed web-based pipeline comprises multiple steps, including quality
control, trimming, reference search, genome assembly, and mix-infection detection
(Figure 1). The pipeline starts with investigation of the overall quality of the raw NGS
data with FastQC v0.10.1 (197). It generates composition statistics of the raw data,
including read number, read length, and base quality. The reads in the raw data are
trimmed with Trimmomatic v0.32 (198). In this step, nucleotide bases are removed from
both ends of the read if their quality falls below a pre-defined threshold; and the read is
clipped if the average quality within a sliding window falls below a threshold quality.
After that, reads above a specified length are retained for further analyses. The quality of
the trimmed reads is once again investigated with FastQC v0.10.1.
Genome Assembly
This pipeline enables two modes for sequence assembly: reference-based
assembly and de novo assembly. The reference-based assembly refers to the case when a
reference influenza genome is provided, and then trimmed reads could be directly
mapped to the reference with the implementation of Bowtie v2.0 (199). Local alignment
and pair-end mode are used for reads mapping. The de novo assembly mode is initiated
when a reference genome is not available beforehand. In this case, trimmed reads are de
novo assembled to create contiguous sequence with Velvet v1.2.10 (200). The resulting
contigs are searched against the influenza nucleotide database by BLAST (201) and eight
reference sequences corresponding to eight gene segments are selected. Subsequently, the
influenza genome is assembled as described in the reference-based assembly mode. Each
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nucleotide base in the consensus sequence is determined on the basis of two criteria: (1) it
is supported by a specified mapping coverage, and (2) consensus is reached among reads
cover this position. The subtype of a sample is determined on the basis of the reference
sequences selected for the HA and NA gene segments. When de novo assembly generates
multiple HA and/or NA gene segments corresponding to distinct subtypes, the sample is
identified as a mixed infection sample.

Figure 1

Pipeline for analyzing and assembling NGS data of influenza virus.

Web-based Application
To provide a user-friendly graphic interface and visualization tool, a web-based
application was developed for this influenza genome assembly pipeline. Two assembly
modes, reference-based assembly and de novo assembly, are provided to users as an
option. In the reference-based mode (Figure 2), the user will provide NGS data and a
table that comprises the GenBank accession numbers of the eight reference sequences for
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each sample. Reference sequences will then be obtained from influenza nucleotide
database by the given accession numbers. In addition, users will be asked to provide
parameters for each step in the analysis. For example, threshold quality, sliding window
size, and read threshold length are needed for quality trimming; threshold coverage and
level of consensus are needed for determining the nucleotide base for each position in the
consensus sequence. In the de novo assembly mode, users will provide k-mer length for
de novo assembly.
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Figure 2

Reference-based assembly mode submission interface.

After the analysis, a number of statistics will be provided to users in form of
graphics. These statistics include read number and average base quality in the raw NGS
data and trimmed data, percentile of raw reads retained following quality trimming,
percentile of read that were mapped to the reference genome, and coverage of the
consensus sequences. Users could download these plots and various formats are
supported. The resulting genomic sequence files are provided in both gene-specific and
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sample-specific manners. In addition, the mapping profiles of each sample are available
for users to assess the mapping quality. On the website, users could monitor the progress
of the job and each of its stages in real-time (Figure 3). Our server will notify users when
the job starts and completes via emails. The web-based application was written in PHP
with a core written in Perl. It is freely accessible on SystemsBio Lab website
(http://sysbio.cvm.msstate.edu).

Figure 3

Job status page (job complete).

Testing Datasets and Performance Evaluation
Two datasets were used to evaluate the performance of this web-based influenza
genome assembly pipeline. The reference-based mode was investigated with the first
dataset that comprises NGS data for five influenza reassortants generated through
32

reassortment between a canine H3N2 virus (A/canine/Guangdong/1/2006, H3N2,
Guangdong/1) and a 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus (A/California/04/2009, H1N1,
California/04). The HA gene segment of these reassortants originated from the canine
H3N2 virus and the other seven gene segments were derived from either parental virus.
The complete genomes of these two parental strains were downloaded from GenBank
under the accession number GU433345 to GU433352 and FJ966079 to FJ966086 and
used as references for genome assembly.
The second dataset comprises NGS data for five wild bird origin AIV strains
obtained from earlier surveillance. The subtype of these samples and origin of each gene
segment are unknown. The genomes of these samples were assembled with the de novo
mode imbedded in this pipeline. The resulting genomic sequences were compared with
those generated by CLC Genomics Workbench 9.0.1 (CLC bio, Aarhus, Denmark),
which is a commercially available software that provides genomic analyses and assembly
package. In CLC Genomics Workbench, trimmed reads were de novo assembled to
generate continuous sequences using the contig sequences (fast) mode and the contig
length threshold was set to 200. Reads were mapped to the references that were found by
BLAST the resulting contigs to influenza nucleotide database.
Results
Under the reference-based assembly mode, this pipeline first investigates the
quality of the raw NGS data for the five reassortant viruses. Quality control results
showed that the number of read pair for each sample ranges from 289,554 to 347,858.
The length of reads falls in the range from 32 bp to 301 bp. The average quality score for
each position range from 34.45 to 36.64. The quality of the raw NGS data was improved
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through quality trimming. Quality trimming retained around 85% of the reads in the raw
data and increased the average base quality to the range between 36.59 and 37.43 (Figure
4).
Examination of the mapping profile showed that more than 98.95% of the
trimmed reads were successfully mapped to the eight reference sequences for each
sample. A 100% coverage was observed for all eight reference sequences for each sample
and the average mapping depth for each reference sequence ranges from 2,855 to 7,642.
The consensus sequences generated by this pipeline were compared with those obtained
from GenBank. Among the 40 newly generated genomic sequences, 19 sequences
corresponding to six gene segments were identical to those from GenBank; and 21
sequences corresponding to the remaining nine gene segments possess one to six
nucleotide substitutions. The nucleotide substitutions were consistent for genomic
sequences corresponding to gene segment derived from the same parental virus. For
example, five genomic sequences of the HA gene segment originated from the canine
H3N2 virus all have two nucleotide differences: A695T and T713G. Further investigation
of the mapping profile showed adequate mapping depth and consensus for these
positions. The nucleotide substitutions were not introduced by this pipeline but may
originate from manipulation of these samples such as adaptation during viral culture.
These results suggested that the reference-based assembly mode in this pipeline could
successfully recover the complete genome from raw NGS data of influenza virus.
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Figure 4

Reference-based assembly mode result page.

Next, the performance of the de novo assembly mode was investigated. Among
the five tested samples, eight reference sequences corresponding to eight gene segments
were found for four samples. Thus, these four samples were designed as single infection.
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More than 99.00% of the trimmed reads were successfully mapped to the references. A
100% coverage was observed for the eight reference sequences of four single infection
samples and the average mapping depth for each reference sequence ranges from 862 to
6,817 (Figure 5). Genomic sequences generated by this pipeline were compared with
those by Genomics Workbench and results showed a 100% sequence identity. For the last
sample, this pipeline found nine reference sequences comprising two references for the
NA gene segment corresponding to the subtype N2 and N7, respectively. The resulting
sequences from this pipeline comprise two complete NA sequences of the subtype N2
and N7. In addition, one reference sequence of the subtype H7 was identified for the HA
gene segment. Thus, this sample was assigned to mixed infection on the basis of these
results.

Figure 5

Coverage of resulting sequences of de novo assembly mode.
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Discussion
In summary, a publically available web-based pipeline for analyzing and
assembling NGS data of influenza virus was developed. This pipeline enables the
detection of eight closely matched references, full genomic assembly for influenza
genome, and detection of the presence of mixed infection of multiple IAVs in a sample.
The web-based application provides a user-friendly graphic interface and visualization
for users. The pitfall of this study is that, for a sample with mixed infections, this pipeline
still has difficulties in classifying the short reads and recovering homologous genomic
sequences.
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THE GENESIS OF A NOVEL LPAI H10N8 VIRUS AND THE SOURCE OF
H10N8 HUMAN INFECTIONS IN CHINA
In December 2013, a novel LPAI H10N8 virus emerged, causing three human
infections in Jiangxi, China (170). Genetic analysis showed that the novel virus was a
reassortant comprising HA and NA gene segments from wild bird origin IAVs and the six
internal gene segments from the H9N2 viruses circulating among domestic poultry in the
region; however, the source of human infections with the novel LPAI H10N8 virus was
not determined. LPMs have been identified as a high risk factor for the zoonotic
transmission of AIVs in Southern China (182) and we hypothesized that LPMs are the
source of H10N8 human infections. We characterized 361 samples collected from April
2013 to January 2014, including 217 samples collected prior to the detection of H10N8
human infection, at the LPM visited by the first index case. Results showed a gradual
increase in IAV prevalence and detection of H10 viruses. AIVs that are genetically close
to the human H10N8 isolate were recovered from samples collected in this LPM. In
addition, we performed HI assays for 800 sera samples collected from chickens and
ducks at five LPMs in Nanchang and observed high seroprevalence of H10 virus. These
findings suggested that LPM is the most probable source of human infection with this
novel H10N8 virus, and this virus appears to present throughout the LPM system in the
city. These findings highlight the role of LPMs in the zoonotic transmission of AIVs, and
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suggest influenza ecosystem in Southern China could favor the emergence of novel IAV
strains that potentially present risk to both animal and human health. Reduction of the
influenza virus burden in LPMs is essential in preventing future emergence of novel IAV
strains with zoonotic and pandemic potential.
Introduction
LPMs are considered as an important link in the ecology and epidemiology of
IAVs (173). LPMs host a large number of birds among different species in a high-density
setting. Live animals are usually brought into the LPMs on a daily basis, and live animals
could be carried over in LPMs from one day to the next and even up to weeks for some
birds. Thus, LPMs provide an ideal environment for maintenance and transmission of
IAVs among these birds and facilitate diversification of IAVs through reassortment. In
addition, LPMs provide an environment for direct contact between humans and infected
live animals and could serve as the source of potential zoonotic transmission of IAVs.
In the United States, LPAI H7N2 virus was detected in the LPMs in the northeast
in 1994, and this virus continued to circulate in the LPMs until 2006 (129, 181).
Reassortment was observed between LPAI H7N2 and other IAVs circulating in the
LPMs. In 2003, a LPAI H7N2 virus strain was isolated from an immunocompromised
man with fever and community-acquired pneumonia in New York (202). Although the
source of this human infection case could not be determined, the virus was suspected to
originate from the LPMs.
In China, the association between LPMs and zoonotic transmission of AIVs was
suggested by reported human infections of HPAI H5N1 and LPAI H9N2 viruses (Figure
6). In May 1997, an avian origin H5N1 IAV strain was isolated from a boy died of
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respiratory illness in Hong Kong (20). A total of 18 cases of human infection with the
H5N1 virus were reported in Hong Kong by the end of the year and six cases were fatal.
Human infections with LPAI H9N2 virus were reported in China in 1999 (176), 2003
(203), and 2013 (204), respectively. LPMs were indicated to be the source of human
infections with H5N1 and H9N2 viruses (182). Human infection with a novel LPAI
H7N9 virus was first reported in eastern China in March 2013 (177, 185). LPAI H7N9
virus has caused more than 500 human cases and claimed >100 lives ever since
(http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/influenza_h7n9/en/). LPMs were
also indicated as the most likely source of human infections with the H7N9 virus. This
was supported by the significant decrease of mean daily number of infections in major
cities in China following measures taken to close LPMs (186).
In December 2013, human infection with a novel avian origin H10N8 virus was
reported in Jiangxi, China. The first patient infected with H10N8 virus was hospitalized
on November 30, three days after illness onset (170). The patient had visited a local LPM
four days prior to the illness onset. Genetic analysis results showed that the novel H10N8
virus was a reassortant possessing HA and NA gene segments from wild bird origin IAVs
and six internal gene segments from poultry-origin H9N2 virus. Two more cases of
human infections with this novel H10N8 virus were reported in January and February
2014, in Jiangxi. The source of human infections with this virus was not determined. We
hypothesize that local LPMs are the source of human infections and we analyzed 361
influenza virus samples collected in the LPM visited by the first patient to infer the
possible source of the zoonotic transmission of the novel H10N8 virus.
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Figure 6

Avian origin influenza A viruses that caused zoonotic infections in Southern
China during the past two decades.

Materials and Methods
Sample Collection
Sampling was conducted in the LPM at the Donghu District of Nanchang City,
Jiangxi from April 5, 2013 to January 1, 2014. A total of 361 swabs were collected on ten
individual time periods, April 5 (number of samples, 47), April 9 (13), June 16 (23), July
25 (64), August 10 (57), August 24 (13), December 12 (46), December 17 (35),
December 22, 2013 (36), and January 1, 2014 (27) (Table 1). These samples were
collected predominantly from chicken, duck, goose, and four minor species, including
pheasant, guinea fowl, pigeon, and turtle doves. In addition, 47 environmental samples
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were collected by swabbing feces in the cages and on the floor of this LPM, especially
when samples from live birds were not accessible. The rectal swabs were collected from
waterfowl species such as ducks and geese, whereas both oropharyngeal and rectal swabs
were taken from the terrestrial birds, including chickens, pigeons, guinea fowl, and turtle
doves.
The swabs from each bird or environmental specimen were placed in a tube with
M199 transport medium (GIBCO, location) containing 0.5% bovine serum albumin
(BSA) and Penicillin G (2 X 106 U/liter), Streptomycin 200 mg/liter. Samples were kept
in an ice box before and during shipment to the laboratory and then stored at -80 °C. All
manipulations of these samples were conducted under enhanced Biosafety Level 2 (BSL2) containment facilities at the College of Animal Science and Technology, Jiangxi
Agricultural University.
RNA Extraction and IAV Screening
Viral RNA was extracted from the clinical swabs using the QIAamp Viral RNA
mini Kit (Qiagen, Valencia, CA) in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions. These
viral RNA samples were subject to M-gene based IAV screening followed by H7 subtype
specific screening using the AgPath-ID™ One-Step RT-PCR Reagent according to the
diagnosis manual from WHO)
(http://www.who.int/influenza/resources/documents/molecular_diagnosis_
influenza_virus_humans_update_201108.pdf). The H7 specific primer was adapted from
(205).
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Viral Isolation
The non-H7 positive swabs were inoculated into ten day old specific pathogen
free chicken embryonated eggs. The eggs were inoculated for 72 hours at 37°C before
harvesting.
Hemagglutination and Hemagglutination Inhibition Assays
Both hemagglutination and hemagglutination inhibition assays were conducted
according the instruction described in the OIE manual for avian influenza diagnosis using
0.5% chicken red blood cells
(http://web.oie.int/fr/normes/mmanual/2008/pdf/2.03.04_AI.pdf). The goat anti-H10
polyclonal antisera were diluted to 1:40 before the HI assays.
Reverse Transcription, PCR, and Genomic Sequencing
The full-length cDNA were amplified from the swabs using SuperScript™ OneStep RT-PCR (Invitrogen, Grand Island, NY). Briefly, total RNA 5 ul, uni-12 2 ul, dNTP
1 ul, and RNase/DNase free water 5 ul, were incubated at 65°C for five minutes and then
one minute on ice. Then 1 ul of DTT, 1 ul of RNAse, and 4 ul of buffer, and 1 ul of RT
superscript III were added and incubated at 55°C for one hour and then 75°C for 15
minutes. PCR amplification was performed with universal primers U-12 and U-13
Phusion® High-fidelity PCR MMW/HF buffer (New England Biolabs, Ipswich, MA)
according to the manufacturer’s instruction and followed by eight pairs of gene specific
primers (206). PCR product was then purified using QIAquick® PCR Purification Kit
(Qiagen, Valencia, CA) according to the manufacturer’s protocol.

43

All M-gene positive samples were subjective to full genome sequencing using
next generation sequencing. Sequencing libraries were prepared from 1 ng cDNA using
the Nextera XT kit according to manufacturer’s instructions (Illumina, San Diego, CA).
Sequencing was performed on an Illumina MiSeq using V2 reagent kits according to the
manufacturer’s instructions. Sanger sequencing was utilized to fill sequence gaps from
the MiSeq run using gene specific primers for the corresponding gene segment. The PCR
product was purified by QIAquick® Gel Extraction Kit (Qiagen, Valencia, CA)
according to manufacturer’s protocol and subjected to sequencing using ABI 3730xl
capillary DNA Analyzers.
Genomic Assembly
Genomic assembly was conducted with CLC Genomics Workbench 6 (CLC bio,
Aarhus, Denmark). Quality trimming was first conducted to remove reads with two or
more ambiguous nucleotides and those below a quality cutoff value of 20. The qualityfiltered reads were de novo assembled in the fast contig mode and then each assembled
contig was BLAST searched against the influenza database to select the best-matched
reference sequence. Quality-filtered reads were mapped to the reference sequence and
consensus sequences were generated. If two or more genetically distinct references were
identified, the quality-filtered reads were matched to each and multiple consensus
sequences were generated. If these consensus sequences from a single sample were
genetically distinct, this sample was defined as a mixed infection. Each consensus
sequence was examined manually to correct potential assembly errors, such as single
nucleotide deletions and insertions.
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Phylogenetic Analysis and Molecular Characterization
To recover evolutionary history of H10N8 virus, sequences recovered from this
study were combined with those from public database for phylogenetic analyses.
Phylogenetic tree was inferred using Maximum Likelihood method implemented in
GARLI version 0.951 (207).
Serological Surveillance
To investigate the spread of H10N8 virus in the LPMs system in Nanchang, we
collected a total of 800 sera samples from chickens and ducks in five LPMs, from
February 25, 2014, to March 27, 2014. These five LPMs cover a geographic area of about
160 square kilometers and the major metropolitan area of Nanchang. Sera positive was
determined using HI assay with a H10N8 virus isolated from the surveillance.
Results
The LPM that the first H10N8 patient visited is in the Donghu district of
Nanchang City; and we conducted sporadic virologic surveillance at this LPM since April
2013. The number of poultry retailers within this LPM ranges from 20 to 30, and a total
of around 1,500 birds are sold per day. The number of poultry retailers and birds being
sold vary with season change and other factors. Typically about 90% of birds sold in this
market are chickens and ducks with wild birds occasionally being sold as well. Between
April 5, 2013, and January 1, 2014, we collected 361 samples from this LPM on ten
separate sampling occasions (Table 1). These samples included 192 paired oropharyngeal
and cloacal swabs from chickens, pheasant, guinea fowl, pigeon, and turtle doves, as well
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as 122 cloacal swabs from ducks and geese. In addition, 47 environmental samples were
also collected by swabbing feces in the cages and from the floor of this LPM.
The proportion of IAV positive samples among these collected samples, as
measured by M-gene real time PCR, increased from 4.3% on April 5, to 38.5% on
August 24, and to 87.0% on December 12, 2013. The proportion of IAV positive
samples, albeit still high, dropped to 48.0% on January 1, 2014 (Table 1). Among these
M-gene positive specimens, ten were subtyped as H7 by H7 specific real time PCR (205)
and 16 as H10 by H10 specific HI assays (Figure 7, Table 1).

Figure 7

Isolation of H10 influenza A virus from the LPM visited by the first H10N8
patient.

To determine if H10N8 viruses, had been and had continued to circulate in this
market, we sequenced positive samples collected on the April, December, and January
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sampling occasions (the first index case was admitted to the hospital in late November).
From the April sampling, we sequenced all five positive samples and detected H7 and H9
HA genes in conjunction with N2 and N9 NA genes. Although no H10 or N8 genes were
detected, we found PB2, PA, NP, MP, and NS genes were genetically similar to the
human H10N8 virus. From the December sampling, we successfully generated sequences
from 44 of the 86 positive samples. Twelve samples contained H10 genes, all of which
also contained N8 genes, though some did appear to be mixed infections containing gene
segments from other viruses such as H9N2. From the January sampling, six samples had
both H10 and N8 genes (Table 2).
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64
(34.4%)

57
(26.3%)

18
(16.7%)

18
(0%)

21
(57.1%)

13
(38.5%)

13
(38.5%)

46
(87%)

11
(81.8%)

10
(80%)

25
(92%)

4

23
(8.7%)

5
(0%)

12/12/13

H7

13
(15.4%)

8
(12.5%)

8/24/13

Number sampled (%) positive

8/10/13

7

47
(4.3%)

8
(0%)

16
(6.3%)

30
(20%)
5
(40%)

29
(48.3%)

7/25/13

H10

Total

Environmental

Turtle Doves

Goose

Pigeon

8
(12.5%)

11
(9.1%)

Guinea Fowl

Duck

1
(100%)

5
(20%)

5
(0%)

Pheasant

6/16/13
9
(0%)

4/9/13

7
(0%)

4/5/13

2

35
(68.6%)

16
(56.3%)

19
(78.9%)

12/17/13

1

1

36
(61.1%)

5
(60%)

15
(73.3%)

16
(50%)

12/22/13

Statistics of influenza surveillance conducted in the LPM visited by the first H10N8 patient.

Chicken

Sample type

Table 1

48

5

6

27
(48.0%)

12
(58.3%)

15
(40%)

1/1/14

10

16

361
(40.7%)

47
(42.6%)

8
(0%)

11
(9.1%)
109
(38.5%)
21
(14.3%)
13
(7.7%)

11
(18.2%)

141
(55.3%)

Total

KM234709 KM234711 KM234706 KM234707 KM234708 KM234710 KM234712 KM234713
KM234718 KM234720 KM234714; KM234716 KM234717 KM234719 KM234721 KM234722
KM234715
KM234726
KM234723 KM234724 KM234725 KM234727 KM234728 KM234729

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA131919/2013(mixed,H10,N2,N8) 12/12/13

A/environment/Jiangxi/JXA131877/2013(mixed,H10,N8, 12/12/13
N2)
A/environment/Jiangxi/JXA131921/2013(mixed,H10,N2, 12/12/13
N8)
A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA131901/2013(mixed,H10,H9,N2,N 12/12/13
8)
A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA131906/2013(mixed,H10,H9,N2,N 12/12/13
8)
A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA131864/2013(H9N2)
12/12/13
12/12/13
12/12/13
12/12/13

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA131923/2013(H9N2)

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA131875/2013(H?N2)

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA131893/2013(H?N2)

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA131916/2013(mixed,H10,N2,N8) 12/12/13

KM234763

N2

N2

N2

N2

N2

N1/N
2
H10
N2/N
8
H10
N2/N
8
H10
N2/N
8
H10
N2/N
8
H10
N2/N
8
H10
N2/N
8
H10
N2/N
8
H10/H9 N2/N
8
H10/H9 N2/N
8
H9
N2
KM234753 KM234754 KM234755 KM234756; KM234758 KM234759; H9
KM234757
KM234760
KM234761
KM234762

KM234742 KM234744 KM234738; KM234740 KM234741 KM234743 KM234745 KM234746
KM234739
KM234747 KM234748 KM234749 KM234750 KM234751 KM234752

KM234733 KM234735 KM234730 KM234731 KM234732 KM234734 KM234736 KM234737

KM234696 KM234698 KM234691; KM234693; KM234695 KM234697 KM234699 KM234700
KM234692 KM234694
KM234701 KM234703
KM234702 KM234704 KM234705

KM234679 KM234681 KM234682

KM234673 KM234674 KM234677

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA131890/2013(mixed,H10,N2,N8) 12/12/13

KM234672

KM234686 KM234688 KM234683 KM234684 KM234685 KM234687 KM234689 KM234690

4/9/13

A/goose/Jiangxi/JXA130246/2013(mixed, H?,N1,N2)

KM234667 KM234669 KM234671 H9

KM234663 KM234665 KM234666 H9

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA131869/2013(mixed,H10,N2,N8) 12/12/13

4/9/13

A/goose/Jiangxi/JXA130250/2013(mixed, H9,N2)

KM234662

KM234678 KM234680

4/9/13

A/pheasant/Jiangxi/JXA130232/2013(mixed,H9,N2)

PA
NP
MP
NS
HA
NA
KM234653 KM234654 KM234655 KM234656; H7/H9 N2/N
KM234657
9
KM234660 KM234661

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA131855/2013(mixed,H10,N2,N8) 12/12/13

4/5/13

A/turtledoves/Jiangxi/JXA130022/2013(H?N?)

GenBank Accession Number
HA
NA
PB2
PB1
KM234652

Summary of genomic sequences recovered from the LPM visited by the first H10N8 patient.

Name
Date
A/pigeon/Jiangxi/JXA130010/2013(mixed,H7,H9,N2,N9) 4/5/13

Table 2
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12/17/13
12/17/13
12/17/13

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA131963/2013(H9N2)

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA131973/2013(H9N2)

A/duck/Jiangxi/JXA131977/2013(H9N2)

12/17/13
12/17/13
12/17/13
12/22/13
12/22/13
12/22/13
12/22/13
12/22/13
12/22/13
12/22/13
12/22/13
12/22/13
12/22/13
12/22/13
12/22/13

A/duck/Jiangxi/JXA131996/2013(H?N2)

A/duck/Jiangxi/JXA132023/2013(H?N2)

A/duck/Jiangxi/JXA131986/2013(mixed,H6,N2)

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA132379/2013(H10,N8,N2)

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA132304/2013(H9N2)

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA132363/2013(H9N2)

A/duck/Jiangxi/JXA132308/2013(H9N2)

A/duck/Jiangxi/JXA132362/2013(mixed,H9,N2,N8)

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA132322/2013(H?N8)

A/environment/Jiangxi/JXA132335/2013(H?N2)

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA132328/2013(H?N2)

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA132321/2013(H?N?)

A/duck/Jiangxi/JXA132323/2013(H?N?)

A/duck/Jiangxi/JXA132348/2013(H?N?)

A/environment/Jiangxi/JXA132330/2013(H?N?)

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA131981/2013(mixed,H10,N2,N8) 12/17/13

12/17/13

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA131985/2013(H6N2)

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA131964/2013(mixed,H10,N2,N8) 12/17/13

Table 2 (continued)
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KM234790 KM234791 KM234792 KM234793 KM234794 KM234795 H9

KM234784 KM234785 KM234786 KM234787 KM234788 KM234789 H9

KM234771 KM234772; KM234774 KM234775 KM234776 KM234777 H6
KM234773
KM234778 KM234779 KM234780 KM234781 KM234782 KM234783 H9

KM234764 KM234765 KM234766 KM234768 KM234769 KM234770 H10

KM234861

KM234879

KM234877

KM234880

KM234878

KM234871 KM234872 KM234873 KM234874 KM234875 KM234876

KM234865 KM234866 KM234867 KM234868 KM234869 KM234870

KM234864

KM234860 KM234862 KM234863

KM234857 KM234853 KM234854 KM234855 KM234856 KM234858 KM234859 H9

KM234847 KM234848 KM234849 KM234850 KM234851 KM234852 H9

KM234841 KM234842 KM234843 KM234844 KM234845 KM234846 H9

KM234835 KM234836 KM234837 KM234838 KM234839 KM234840 H9

KM234818; KM234820 KM234821 KM234822; KM234824; KM234826 H6
KM234819
KM234823 KM234825
KM234830 KM234832 KM234827 KM234828 KM234829 KM234831 KM234833 KM234834 H10

KM234812 KM234813 KM234814 KM234815 KM234816 KM234817

KM234800 KM234802 KM234796; KM234798 KM234799 KM234801 KM234803; KM234805; H10
KM234797
KM234804 KM234806
KM234807
KM234808 KM234809 KM234810 KM234811

KM234767

N2

N2

N2/N
8
N8

N2

N2

N8/N
2
N2

N2

N2

N2/N
8
N2

N2

N2

N2

N2/N
8
N2
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1/1/14
1/4/14
1/1/14
1/1/14
1/1/14
1/4/14

A/duck/Jiangxi/JXA132712/2014(H10N8)

A/duck/Jiangxi/JXA132762/2014(mixed, H?,N8,N2)

A/duck/Jiangxi/JXA132719/2014(H9N2)

A/duck/Jiangxi/JXA132718/2014(mixed,H10,N2,N8)

A/duck/Jiangxi/JXA132712/2014(H10N8)

A/duck/Jiangxi/JXA132762/2014(mixed, H?,N8,N2)

1/1/14

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA132713/2014(mixed,H10,N2,N8)

1/1/14

12/22/13

A/environment/Jiangxi/JXA132345/2013(H?N?)

A/duck/Jiangxi/JXA132718/2014(mixed,H10,N2,N8)

12/22/13

A/environment/Jiangxi/JXA132327/2013(H?N?)

1/1/14

12/22/13

A/environment/Jiangxi/JXA132326/2013(H?N?)

A/duck/Jiangxi/JXA132719/2014(H9N2)

12/22/13

A/duck/Jiangxi/JXA132366/2013(H?N?)

1/1/14

12/22/13

A/duck/Jiangxi/JXA132339/2013(H?N?)

A/duck/Jiangxi/JXA132727/2014(H10N8)

12/22/13

A/duck/Jiangxi/JXA132338/2013(H?N?)

1/1/14

12/22/13

A/duck/Jiangxi/JXA132309/2013(H?N?)

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA132731/2014(mixed,H10,N2,N8)

12/22/13

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA132388/2013(H?N2)

1/1/14

12/22/13

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA132359/2013(H?N2)

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA132717/2014(H10N8)

12/22/13

A/chicken/Jiangxi/JXA132357/2013(H?N?)

Table 2 (continued)

KM234889

KM234888

KM234887

KM234886

KM234938 KM234939 H10

KM234938 KM234939 H10
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KM234944 KM234940 KM234941 KM234942 KM234943 KM234945 KM234946

KM234936 KM234937

KM234931 KM234933 KM234928 KM234929 KM234930 KM234932 KM234934 KM234935 H10

KM234922 KM234923 KM234924 KM234925 KM234926 KM234927 H9

KM234944 KM234940 KM234941 KM234942 KM234943 KM234945 KM234946

KM234936 KM234937

KM234931 KM234933 KM234928 KM234929 KM234930 KM234932 KM234934 KM234935 H10

KM234922 KM234923 KM234924 KM234925 KM234926 KM234927 H9

KM234917 KM234919 KM234914 KM234915 KM234916 KM234918 KM234920 KM234921 H10

KM234909 KM234911 KM234906 KM234907 KM234908 KM234910 KM234912 KM234913 H10

KM234901 KM234903 KM234898 KM234899 KM234900 KM234902 KM234904 KM234905 H10

KM234893 KM234895 KM234890 KM234891 KM234892 KM234894 KM234896 KM234897 H10

KM234882 KM234883 KM234884 KM234885

KM234881

N2/N8

N8

N2/N8

N2

N2/N8

N8

N2/N8

N2

N8

N2/N8

N8

N2/N8

N2

N2

The presence of mixed infections makes it difficult to determine the exact
genotypes of the viruses. For example, there were 16 samples that contained H10 genes,
12 that contained H9 genes, two that contained H6 genes, and three that contained two
HA genes (two H10/H9 and one H7/H9). Among the 16 samples that contained H10
viruses, only two were of the N8 subtype; the remaining 14 samples were mixed
infections with both N2 and N8 genes present. The two mixed H10/H9 samples had both
N2 and N8 NA genes as well. Besides the mixed HA and NA samples, 12 had at least
two copies of the same gene segments, such as PB2, PB1, NP, MP, and NS, and these
gene segments were genetically distinct. Of the 57 samples sequenced, 25 samples were
determined to have at least two genetically distinct influenza viruses.
Phylogenetic analyses of the generated sequences showed that 18 H10 and 19 N8
genes forming a monophyletic clade with the corresponding genes of the human H10N8
virus (Figure 8, Figure 9). The H10 and N8 genes were genetically close to those of
viruses isolated from wild birds: H10 gene from the Eurasian lineage and N8 gene from
the North American lineage. In contrast, the internal genes sequenced were close to those
derived from AIVs circulating among domestic poultry and some are similar to those
present in the human H10N8 virus
(Phylogenetic_trees_of_internal_genes_recovered_from_the_samples_collected_at_the_
LPM.pdf). These data confirm that nucleotide sequences of viruses more than 99%
identical to those of the human H10N8 virus were circulating in this LPM, supporting the
likelihood that the zoonotic transmission had occurred here.
The diversity of internal gene segments revealed that multiple distinct viruses
were circulating in this individual LPM. The PB2 genes were clustered into seven distinct
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genetic lineages, PB1 into five, PA into four, NP into six, MP into six, and NS into three
(Phylogenetic_trees_of_internal_genes_recovered_from_the_samples_collected_at_the_
LPM.pdf). Among these genes, PB2 from the 18 samples alone belong to five distinct
genetic lineages. In contrast, NP, MP, and NS gene of those samples with H10 gene were
similar. None of the internal genes of these H10N8 samples were unique from those
found in H9 and other subtypes of IAV from this LPM. The genetic lineages containing
the samples collected on April 5, 2013, were surprisingly associated with the H10 viruses
in December 2013.
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Figure 8

Maximum likelihood phylogenetic trees of H10 genes recovered from the
samples collected at the LPM.

The genes of IAV recovered from our surveillance are marked in red and that from the
human H10N8 isolate are in green.
54

Figure 9

Maximum likelihood phylogenetic trees of N8 genes recovered from the
samples collected at the LPM.

The genes of IAV recovered from our surveillance are marked in red and that from the
human H10N8 isolate are in green.
The amino acid sequences at the receptor binding sites of the H10 proteins
encoded by the genes from this LPM were identical to those in the human H10N8 isolate,
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and the majority of these sites except 128 (137, H3 position) and 181 (193, H3 position)
were shown to be divergent from H10 AIVs from public databases: the H10 viruses
recovered in this study had R128 (100%) and I181 (61%) while those from public
database predominantly had K (67.8%) and T (97.7%), respectively (Table 3). The
human H10N8 isolate has R128 and T181. The impact of I181T on host or tissue tropism
of the H10N8 virus is unknown; nevertheless, the receptor binding properties are
predicted to be avian-like.
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Resid
ue #
88
125
126
127
128
129
144
176
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221

H3 residue #
98
134
135
136
137
138
153
183
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228

JXA
Y 100%
G 100%
T 100%
T 100%
R 100%
A 100%
W 100%
H 100%
I 61%, T 39%
Q 100%
E 100%
K 100%
N 100%
D 100%
L 100%
Y 100%
P 100%
Q 100%
V 100%
N 100%
G 100%
Q 100%
S 100%
G 100%

Donghu
Y
G
T
T
R
A
W
H
T
Q
E
K
N
D
L
Y
P
Q
V
N
G
Q
S
G

Animal host H10
Y 100%
G 100%
T 97.6%,N 0.2%,D 1.5%,A 0.4%
T 100%
K 67.8%,R 20.9%,Q 8.5%,I 0.4%,G 0.6%,E 0.6%
A 96.7%,S 3.3%
W 100%
H 100%
T 97.7%,I 0.6%,A 1.7%
Q 97.5%,K 2.1%,E 0.2%,H 0.2%
E 100%
K 99.6%,R 0.2%,T 0.2%
N 99.6%,S 0.2%,D 0.2%
D 97.7%,K 0.2%,N 1.7%,E 0.4%
L 100%
Y 100%
P 100%
Q 99.7%,L 0.2%
V 100%
N 99.4%,D 0.2%,K 0.4%
G 99.7%,S 0.2%
Q 100%
S 99.2%,G 0.2%,R 0.6%
G 99.7%,A 0.2%

The amino acid diversity in the influenza biomarkers of viruses recovered from the LPM visited by the first H10N8
patient.

H10: residues in the receptor binding sites

Table 3
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H3 residue
#

H3 residue
#

JXA
I 100%
R 100%
E 100%
Q 100%
D 100%
R 100%
I 100%
R 100%
H 100%
E 100%
R 100%
N 100%
V 100%
R 100%

Donghu
I
R
E
Q
D
R
I
R
H
E
R
N
V
R

Animal host H10
I 100%
I 100%
E 100%
Q 100%
D 100%
R 100%
I 100%
R 100%
H 100%
E 100%
R 100%
N 100%
V 100%
R 100%

JXA
V 100%
H 100%
E 100%
D 100%

Donghu
V
H
K
D

Animal host H10
V 99.6%,M 0.4%
H 99.6%,N 0.4%
E 99.3%,0.7%
D 99.3%,N 0.7%

Residue #
473
598

H3 residue
#

JXA
V100%
L 100%

Donghu
V
L

Animal host H10
V 99.8%,I 0.2%
L 100%

PB1: residues potentially increase replication efficiency

Residue #
89
357
627
701

PB2: residues potentially increase viral pathogenesis and enhance viral transmission

Residue #
115
116
117
134
149
150
221
223
273
275
291
293
312
368

N8: residues potentially being involved in oseltamivir resistance

Table 3 (continued)
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H3 residue #

JXA
A 100%

Donghu
A

Animal host H10
A 99.2%,T 0.4%,V 0.2%,S 0.2%

H3 residue #

JXA
D 100%
A 100%

Donghu
D
A

Animal host H10
D 100%
A 100%

H3 residue #

H3 residue #

JXA
L 100%
V 100%
A 100%
N 94.1%,S 5.9%
G 100%

Donghu
L
V
A
N
G

Residue #
42

JXA
S 94.4%,A 5.6%

Donghu
S

NS1: residues potentially increase viral pathogenesis

Residue #
26
27
30
31
34
Animal host H10
S 90.3%,A 9.7%

Animal host H10
L 99.8%,I 0.2%
V 98.2%,I 1.8%
A 100%
S 99.8%,N 0.2%
G 100%

M2: residues potentially being involved in amantadine resistance

Residue #
30
215

M1: residues potentially increase influenza pathogenesis

Residue #
36

PA: residues potentially increase replication efficiency

Table 3 (continued)

Analysis of NA gene sequences suggests that these viruses are sensitive to
oseltamivir and other neuraminidase inhibitors (208). However, 94.1% of the M2
sequences have S31N (209) indicating that they are resistant to amantadine, as was the
human H10N8 isolate (210) (Table 3). All PB2 genes had E627 whereas the PB2 gene of
the human H10N8 isolate had K627, which is considered a marker of mammalian
adaptation (211) (Table 3).
That we were able to detect H10N8 virus in December and early January
following human infection raised the question of how widely this virus might be spread
within the LPM system in the region. To estimate this, we conducted serologic
surveillance at four additional LPMs in Nanchang city. We collected a total of 800 sera
from chickens and ducks at these five LPMs, from February 25, 2014, to March 27, 2014
(Figure 10). These five LPMs cover a geographic area of about 160 square kilometers
and the major metropolitan area of Nanchang. Using HI assays with a H10N8 virus
isolated from the surveillance described above and a cutoff of 1:20, we found that 9.4%
of the 800 sera samples were positive. The H10 positive sera were distributed across all
five sampled LPMs and from both ducks and chickens. The highest H10 positive
percentile on a single market and a single sampling period (34.0%) was detected on
March 9, at LPM A, which the index patient visited (Figure 10). Of note, LPM B located
across the Gan River from LPM A, had close to 50% H10 positivity by the end of March.
These data showed that H10 viruses were widespread in the region’s LPM system.
Although we are unable to determine the exact nature of the H10 virus from these
serologic studies, two human cases with H10N8 infection in Nanchang (in January and
February 2014) are consistent with it being the zoonotic virus. Of these two additional
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human cases, the second human case was documented with a visit to a local LPM prior to
illness onset whereas the exposure history of the third human case was unclear.

Figure 10

Distribution of H10 seropositive samples collected from February 25 to
March 27, 2014 and across five LPMs in Nanchang city.

The seropositive samples were determined by HI assays with a H10N8 virus. LPM A was
the one that the first index H10N8 patient visited in November 2013. The highest H10
positive percentile in a single sampling period was marked for each LPM.
Discussion
In summary, we show that the LPM visited by the index H10N8 female patient
was very likely the source of her infection and that the virus appears to have been present
throughout the LPM system in Nanchang, China. However, the findings in this study
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were limited by the small number of samples we collected and by the fact that the H10N8
virus prior to the emergence of the first human case was lacking. It is unclear whether
these H10N8 viruses were introduced into the LPM system or were generated in the
LPMs. Continuous influenza surveillance is needed to monitor the epidemiology of the
novel H10N8 virus in Nanchang as well as those areas that share poultry movements with
Nanchang. In addition to those minor poultry species, there are a variety of chicken and
duck species in the LPM; further studies will be needed to identify the reservoir for the
H10N8 virus among these bird species, and such information will be useful for
developing effective strategies for prevention and control of the H10N8 virus at the LPM.
AIVs were identified in LPMs in China a few decades ago. The first LPAI H9N2
virus was initially isolated from domestic poultry in 1994 (212), and has since been found
to be endemic among domestic poultry in China (213). Besides infecting poultry, this
H9N2 virus has caused sporadic infections in humans (176, 203). The H9N2 virus has
undergone rapid evolution and contemporary H9N2 viruses are both genetically and
antigenically diverse (214-216). The internal gene segments of H9N2 viruses contributed
to the genomic diversity of HPAI H5N1 viruses in China (217, 218). The novel LPAI
H7N9 viruses emerged in Yangze Delta possess six gene segments derived from H9N2
viruses, and mixed infections of H7N9 and H9N2 viruses are very common (185). This
study suggested further that novel H10N8 IAVs were frequently co-infected with H9N2
viruses, and their internal gene constellations were similar to each other. It seems that this
diverse genetic pool is potentially more dangerous than any single virus. With any chance
to interact with other subtypes of HA and NA genes, novel reassortants could emerge,
including some strains that are antigenically distinct from the contemporary human IAVs.
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These emerging viruses, including H5N1, H7N9, H9N2, and H10N8, are continuous
threats to public health.
A large influenza vaccine campaign against HPAI H5N1 viruses has been
conducted in China since 2004. H9N2 vaccines have also been distributed to domestic
poultry farms but their implementation has been comparatively less effective. With the
substantial subtype and genetic diversity of viruses within LPMs, vaccination is not a
realistic strategy to reduce the levels of virus circulation and subsequent zoonotic
infections. Other intervention strategies must, therefore, be used to control viral flow into
the LPMs. As it seems impossible to close all LPMs simultaneously, more practical
policies and approaches such as routine surveillance and regular market disinfection
should be urgently implemented.
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THE GENESIS OF A NOVEL HPAI H7N8 VIRUS AND THE EVOLUTIONARY
PATHWAY LEADING TO OUTBREAK AMONG DOMESTIC POULTRY
IN INDIANA, THE UNITED STATES
Introductions of LPAI viruses of subtypes H5/H7 into poultry from wild birds
have the potential to mutate to HPAI, but such viruses’ origin is often unclear. In January
2016, a novel H7N8 HPAI virus caused an outbreak in turkeys in Indiana, USA. To
determine the virus’s origin, we sequenced genomes of 441 wild bird–origin IAVs from
North America and subjected them to evolutionary analyses. Results showed that the
H7N8 LPAI virus most likely circulated among diving ducks in the Mississippi flyway
during autumn 2015 and was subsequently introduced to Indiana turkeys, in which it
evolved into a HPAI form. Preceding the outbreak, an isolate with six gene segments
(except NP and MP) sharing >99% sequence identity with those of H7N8 turkey viruses
was recovered from a diving duck. H4N8 IAVs from diving duck possessed five H7N8–
like gene segments (PB2, PB1, NA, MP, and NS). Our findings suggest that viral gene
constellations circulating among diving ducks can contribute towards the emergence of
IAVs that can affect poultry. Diving ducks may serve as a unique reservoir, contributing
to the maintenance, diversification, and transmission of IAVs in wild birds.
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Introduction
IAVs exist in a complex ecosystem that involves various hosts, including humans,
swine, horses, dogs, sea mammals, and numerous wild and domestic bird species. Among
these hosts, wild aquatic birds are considered the natural reservoir for IAVs and bird
migration plays an important role in the dispersal of IAVs. Interactions of migratory bird
at congregation sites enable transmission of IAVs and facilitate genetic diversity through
reassortment. Periodic introduction of IAVs from wild birds to domestic poultry
contributes to emergence of novel IAV strains that occasionally cause outbreaks among
domestic poultry. Following such introductions into domestic poultry, LPAI H5 and H7
viruses have the potential to evolve into HPAI viruses through two mechanisms: 1)
acquisition of basic amino acids in the cleavage region of the HA protein by insertion or
substitution (188), and 2) recombination with another gene segment(s) or host genome
(60, 63, 123). HPAI virus is of particular concern because of the devastating consequence
it brings to the poultry industry; in some outbreaks, mortality could be as high as 100%.
The threats brought by the introduction of entire IAVs or IAV gene segments
from wild birds to domestic poultry has been repeatedly demonstrated by the emergence
of novel HPAIs in the Americas. HPAI H5 viruses caused outbreaks of disease among
domestic poultry in 1983 (190), 1994 (191), and 2014 and 2015 (71). In addition to
subtype H5 viruses, HPAI H7 viruses have been frequently reported in the Americas.
There were four reported HPAI H7N3 outbreaks between 2002 and 2016: one outbreak in
Chile (2002) (60), two distinct outbreaks in Canada (2004 and 2007) (61, 62), and one
outbreak in Mexico (2012). High mortality among domestic poultry was reported for
these four HPAI H7N3 outbreaks. Moreover, HPAI H7N3 strains isolated from the
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outbreak in Canada (2004) caused mild respiratory symptoms and conjunctivitis in at
least two humans (192). HPAI H7N3 strains from the outbreak in Mexico (2012) caused
conjunctivitis in two poultry workers (64).
Studies conducted after outbreaks among domestic poultry have usually been
retrospective analyses to determine the identities of the putative precursors of the
outbreak strains. However, direct evidence is lacking on the time of emergence, location
for reassortment, and wild bird species that contribute to the genesis of a particular HPAI
strain. In most cases, the limited surveillance in wild birds prior to the detection of a
novel HPAI strain impedes our understanding of the mechanisms underlining the
emergence.
On January 15, 2016, The United States Department of Agriculture’s Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) announced the detection of a novel HPAI H7N8
virus in a commercial turkey flock experiencing significant mortality in Dubois Country,
Indiana. APHIS reported the identification of LPAI H7N8 virus in eight turkey flocks in
the control area surrounding the location of the initial HPAI case. The detection of this
virus represents the first identification of HPAI H7N8 virus in domestic species. The
objective of study in this chapter was to understand the molecular mechanisms leading to
the emergence of this novel H7N8 virus.
We hypothesized that 1) the H7N8 virus identified in turkeys in Indiana was
initially introduced from wild birds and developed high pathogenicity within poultry
production systems; 2) genetic analysis of a large number of available contemporary wild
bird-origin IAV isolates would indicate what wild bird species and IAVs contributed to
the emergence of the HPAI H7N8 virus. In a collaborative effort, our team sequenced
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441 IAVs obtained through wild bird influenza surveillance during 2007–2016 across
North America. We used the sequence data generated in this study together with the IAV
genomes recovered in association with the H7N8 outbreak in Indiana turkey and public
sequence data to infer the possible origin(s), evolutionary pathway(s), and transmission
route(s) of this novel HPAI H7N8 virus.
Materials and Methods
Viruses
To determine the genetic ancestry of the H7N8 IAV strains associated with the
outbreak of disease in Indiana turkeys, we sequenced a collection of 441 archived wild
bird–origin IAVs obtained throughout North America from influenza surveillance during
2007–2016 (Figure 11). The wild bird–origin isolates represent strains recovered from
Alberta, Canada, and from 38 states within the United States of America. IAVs from
migratory birds from the Atlantic, Central, Mississippi, and Pacific flyways were
included in our dataset. Complete genomes of H7N8 IAVs detected in Indiana turkeys
were downloaded from GenBank: (accession nos. KU558903–KU558910 and
KU585905–KU585920). One of the strains was a HPAI virus, A/turkey/Indiana/16001403-1/2016(H7N8) (Indiana/16-001403-1), and the other two strains were LPAI
viruses, A/turkey/Indiana/16-001573-2/2016(H7N8) (Indiana/16-001573-2) and
A/turkey/Indiana/16-001574-7/2016(H7N8) (16-001574-7).
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Geographic, temporal, and taxa distribution of 441 influenza A virus strains subjected to genomic sequencing in this
study.

(a) Red triangles indicate the state/province where the samples were collected. (b) Numbers above each column indicate the
number of influenza A virus isolates from each year. (c) Distribution of strains among distinct host groups. Map of North America
with US States, Canadian Provinces, and Mexico by FreeVectorMaps.com, https://freevectormaps.com/world-maps/northamerica/WRLD-NA-02-0003.

Figure 11
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Phylogenetic Analyses
Preliminary phylogenetic analyses were performed with the complete genomes of
three H7N8 strains originating from turkeys in Indiana and a genomic sequence dataset
(219) that represents the two major geographically dependent genetic lineages, North
American and Eurasian, for eight gene segments. The next round of phylogenetic
analyses were conducted with an integrated dataset that comprised the complete genomes
of three H7N8 turkey strains, sequence data for 441 IAVs generated in this study, and
sequence data downloaded in May 2016 from the Influenza Research Database (220) for
IAVs isolated from wild and domestic birds in the Americas. The number of genomic
sequences used in analyses for each gene segment is as follows: PB2 (number=7762),
PB1 (n=7813), PA (n=7859), HA (n=1132), NP (n=7327), NA (n=1611), MP (n=7776),
and NS (n=7586). In order to perform more detailed analysis on the timing of the
emergence of the H7N8 viruses, sequences closely related to the H7N8 turkey strains
(referred to henceforth as ‘the H7N8–outbreak lineage’) were selected for each gene
segment from the phylogenetic trees. The number of genomic sequences used in analyses
for each gene segment is as follows: PB2 (number=796), PB1 (n=709), PA (n=757), HA
(n=721), NP (n=651), NA (n=281), MP (n=742), and NS (n=526).
Gene segment–specific phylogenetic trees were generated using the maximum–
likelihood method implemented in RAxML v8.1.17 (221). A general time–reversible
model of nucleotide substitution and a gamma–distributed rate variation among sites was
applied throughout the analyses. Sequence alignments were performed by using
MUSCLE v3.8 (222). We manually examined alignments to ensure accuracy and retained
only the coding region for phylogenetic analyses.
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Molecular Clock
We estimated the time–scaled phylogenies, nucleotide substitution rate, and time
to most recent common ancestor (TMRCA) using the Bayesian Markov Chain Monte
Carlo method implemented in BEAST v1.8.0 (223). Genomic sequences with complete
sampling dates (exact month, day, year) were selected for each gene segment from the
H7N8–outbreak lineage on the basis of phylogenetic trees, and the number of genomic
sequences used in analyses for each gene segment is as follows: PB2 (number=268), PB1
(n=227), PA (n=225), HA (n=206), NP (n=224), NA (n=102), MP (n=220), and NS
(n=160). We used the SRD06 partitioned substitution model, uncorrelated lognormal
relaxed clock model, and Bayesian skyline coalescent tree prior in the analyses. For each
gene segment, we performed two independent runs with a chain length of 100–300
million steps sampled every 10,000 steps (results in >10,000 samples per run). The
results were analyzed in Tracer v1.6 (http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/tracer/). Adequate
burn–in was determined from the trace of each run, and 2%–10% of the initial steps,
representing poor configuration, were removed from further analysis. Convergence of
each run and consistency between two runs was assessed, and results from two runs were
combined for analyses to ensure an adequate effective sample size (>200) was reached
for relevant parameters. The maximum clade credibility trees were summarized with
TreeAnnotator v1.8.0 (http://beast.bio.ed.ac.uk/TreeAnnotator/) and edited in FigTree
v1.4.0 (http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/figtree/).
Discrete Phylogeographic Analyses
The hosts of IAVs in our study were categorized into 11 different groups:
dabbling duck, diving duck (including sea duck), goose and swan, gull and tern,
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passerine, poultry, raptor, seabird, shorebird, other avian, and other non–avian hosts. In
an attempt to keep the number of sequences per host group as balanced as possible, we
conducted sub–sampling for sequences within the H7N8–outbreak lineage for each gene
segment. For each sampling year, 20 sequences were selected for each host group; if a
host group had <20 sequences, all sequences were retained. For the analysis, we used an
asymmetric substitution model with the Bayesian Stochastic Search Variable Selection
and a strict clock model. Two independent runs of chain length of 150 million steps with
sampling every 10,000 steps (results in 15,000 samples per run) were performed for each
gene segment. Similar approach for analyzing the resulting log files of molecular clock
data was applied to analyze burn–in, convergence of each run, and generate maximum
clade credibility phylogenetic trees. Specifically, >10% of initial steps representing poor
configuration were removed as burn–in. Mean transition rate and the corresponding
indicator were calculated from the resulting log files. Bayes Factor (BF) support was
calculated with the indicator to assess statistical support. Significant transition between
host groups was determined based on the combination of BF >3 and mean indicator >0.5.
Therefore, support levels were defined as support (3≤BF<10); strong support
(10≤BF<100); very strong support (100≤BF<1,000); and decisive support (BF≥1,000).
Phylogenetic Network
A phylogenetic network was reconstructed using the quartet–based method
implemented in QuartetMethods (224). A sequence dataset was built by concatenating the
sequences of six internal genes for 6,693 IAVs isolated from wild and domestic birds in
the Americas. The sequences of six internal genes of H7N8 HPAI strain were
concatenated and the resulting sequence was BLASTed (201) against the dataset. Fifty
71

IAV strains that were most closely related to the H7N8 HPAI stain were selected and
included in the analysis.
Genotyping
Genotypes were defined on the basis of the gene segment–specific phylogenetic
trees for H7N8 turkey strains and 135 H4N8 IAV strains. A monophyletic clade was
identified by two criteria: 1) it was supported by a bootstrap value above 70, and 2) all
sequences in the clade had nucleotide sequence identities >98%, as determined by using
the hierarchical clustering method implemented in R (https://www.r-project.org/). We
implemented a stringent cutoff of 98% to identify IAV strains closely related to the H7N8
turkey strains. The genotype of a genome is the combination of the cluster assignment of
eight gene segments.
Results
H7N8 Virus Originated From IAVs in North American Wild Birds
To infer the ancestry of each gene segment of the H7N8 viruses detected in
Indiana turkeys, we first performed preliminary phylogenetic analyses with a collection
of representative genomic sequences to identify the major genetic lineage to which the
H7N8 turkey strains belong. Phylogenetic trees support two geographically dependent
lineages of IAV (North American and Eurasian) for eight gene segments (Figure 12). The
H7N8 turkey strains were found to share genetic ancestry with IAVs from North America
for all eight gene segments.
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Figure 12

Maximum likelihood phylogenetic trees for eight gene segments of H7N8
turkey strains and influenza A viruses representing North American and
Eurasian genetic lineages.

H7N8 strains associated with the outbreak of disease in Indiana turkeys are indicated by
red circles. In (h), black bars indicate two alleles for the NS gene segment.
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We then performed phylogenetic analyses, focusing on genomic sequences of
IAVs isolated from wild and domestic birds in the Americas. The phylogenetic tree for
the H7 gene showed that IAV strains from the Americas could be divided into two
genetic sub–lineages: those from North America and those from South America
(Phylogenetic_trees_of_IAVs_isolated_from_wild_and_domestic_birds_in_the_America
s.pdf). The South American sub–lineage included H7N3 HPAI viruses isolated during an
outbreak in Chile in 2002. Three major genetic clusters were identified in the North
American sub–lineage: cluster I was comprised of viruses isolated from wild and
domestic birds in North America during the 1970s to the early 1990s; cluster II contained
H7N2 IAVs isolated from the live–poultry markets in the northeastern United States
during1994–2006; cluster III represents contemporary H7 IAVs circulating in North
America, including viruses isolated from wild and domestic birds. The novel H7N8
turkey strains grouped with H7 viruses in cluster III and were most closely related to IAV
strains isolated from wild birds
(Phylogenetic_trees_of_IAVs_isolated_from_wild_and_domestic_birds_in_the_America
s.pdf, Time_scale_phylogenetic_trees_for_eight_gene_segments.pdf). The H7N3 HPAI
viruses isolated during three previous outbreaks in North America also grouped with
contemporary H7 IAVs in cluster III; however, these viruses were associated with
monophyletic clades divergent from the clade containing H7N8 turkey strains.
Phylogenetic analyses of the other seven gene segments also showed that the H7N8
turkey strains clustered with North American wild bird–origin IAV strains and in
monophyletic clades different from those containing sequences for H7N3 HPAI viruses
(Phylogenetic_trees_of_IAVs_isolated_from_wild_and_domestic_birds_in_the_America
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s.pdf, Time_scale_phylogenetic_trees_for_eight_gene_segments.pdf). Moreover, in the
phylogenetic trees for eight gene segments, no poultry–origin IAV gene segments were
found to be closely related to the H7N8 turkey strains.
To infer the more detailed evolutionary history of the novel H7N8 viruses, we
conducted molecular clock analyses for each gene segment using sequences in the clades
containing the H7N8 turkey strains and those most closely related strains. The resulting
time–scale maximum clade credibility phylogenetic trees were used to identify viruses
most closely related to H7N8 turkey strains for each gene segment (Figure 13,
Time_scale_phylogenetic_trees_for_eight_gene_segments.pdf). The most closely related
gene segments to H7N8 turkey strains originated from a single isolate, A/Lesser
scaup/Kentucky/AH0012935/2015(H7N8) (Kentucky/AH0012935), for six gene
segments (PB2, PB1, PA, HA, NA, and NS) (Table 4). This isolate was recovered from a
sample collected in Kentucky, USA, on November 28, 2015, approximately seven weeks
before the outbreak and approximately 200 kilometers from the Indiana turkey farm
where outbreak was detected. The close relatedness between Kentucky/AH0012935 and
the novel H7N8 HPAI strain in six gene segments was supported by high nucleotide
sequence identities, ranging from 99.00% (HA gene) to 99.95% (PA gene) (Table 4). The
NP gene segments of two isolates recovered from samples collected in Ohio, on October
18, 2014, A/Northern pintail/Ohio/14OS2209/2014(H5N9) (Ohio/14OS2209) and
A/Northern pintail/Ohio/14OS2210/2014(H5N9) (Ohio/14OS2210), were most closely
related (98.40% nucleotide sequence identity) to the NP gene of the novel H7N8 HPAI
strain (Table 4). The MP gene segment of A/Bufflehead/Illinois/14OS3567/2014(H4N8)
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was most closely related (99.19% nucleotide sequence identity) to that of the H7N8
HPAI strain (Table 4).
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Maximum clade credibility phylogenetic trees for HA (a) and NA (b) gene segments.

The trees are constructed on the basis of the maximum clade credibility phylogenetic trees shown in
Time_scale_phylogenetic_trees_for_eight_gene_segments.pdf. H7N8 strains associated with the outbreak of disease in Indiana
turkeys are indicated by a red box and the highly pathogenic strain is marked with an asterisk. Clade posterior probabilities ≥
0.7 are shown. Horizontal bars indicate 95% highest posterior density of age estimates of tree nodes.

Figure 13

Table 4

Most closely related genes to eight gene segments of the novel highly
pathogenic avian influenza strain A/turkey/Indiana/16-0014031/2016(H7N8).

Segment
Virus
PB2
A/Lesser scaup/Kentucky/AH0012935/2015
PB1
A/Lesser scaup/Kentucky/AH0012935/2015
PA
A/Lesser scaup/Kentucky/AH0012935/2015
HA
A/Lessers caup/Kentucky/AH0012935/2015
A/Northern pintail/Ohio/14OS2209/2014
NP
A/Northern pintail/Ohio/14OS2210/2014
NA
A/Lesser scaup/Kentucky/AH0012935/2015
MP
A/Bufflehead/Illinois/14OS3567/2014
NS
A/Lesser scaup/Kentucky/AH0012935/2015

Sequence Identity Subtype
0.9987
H7N8
0.9987
H7N8
0.9995
H7N8
0.9900
H7N8

Sampling Date
11-28-2015
11-28-2015
11-28-2015
11-28-2015

0.9840

H5N9

10-18-2014

0.9979
0.9919
0.9952

H7N8
H4N8
H7N8

11-28-2015
11-15-2014
11-28-2015

Three H7N8 turkey strains were estimated to share a common ancestor among
eight gene segments between March 2015 (MP gene) and December 2015 (HA gene)
(Figure 14, Table 5). The mean estimated TMRCAs for seven of eight gene segments
(excluding MP gene) was summer and fall (30 June–4 December) of 2015, which
overlaps the late breeding and autumn migration period of many wild birds inhabiting
North America. The HA gene was estimated to have the latest TMRCA (mean December
4, 2015, 95% highest posterior density [HPD] October 30, 2014–January 4, 2016), which
is close to the time when Kentucky/AH0012935 was collected. The mean evolutionary
rate for the H7 gene was estimated to be 6.55 x 10−3 substitutions per site per year (95%
HPD, 5.74–7.52 x 10−3), which is significantly higher than that for the other seven gene
segments (Figure 14, Table 5).
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Figure 14

Estimated time to most recent common ancestor and nucleotide substitution
rates for eight gene segments of H7N8 viruses detected in Indiana turkeys.

Green circles indicate the estimated mean date (a) or rate (b) and grey bars indicate 95%
highest posterior density. Blue circles indicate the sample collection time of influenza A
virus isolate containing the most closely related gene segment to the H7N8 turkey strains.
Red dash line indicates the sample collection time of the highly pathogenic avian
influenza H7N8 virus isolated from Indiana turkeys.
Table 5

Estimated time to most recent common ancestor and nucleotide substitution
rates for eight gene segments of H7N8 viruses detected in Indiana turkeys.
Substitution rate
(x10-3 subs/site/year)
95% HPD
95% HPD
lower
upper

Mean

TMRCA
95% HPD
lower

95% HPD
upper

Segment

Mean

PB2

2.99

2.69

3.29

2015-08-22

2015-04-30

2015-11-25

PB1

3.39

3.03

3.77

2015-09-22

2015-06-21

2015-12-13

PA

2.66

2.28

3.06

2015-11-06

2015-09-01

2015-12-28

HA

6.55

5.74

7.52

2015-12-04

2015-10-30

2016-01-04

NP

2.89

2.53

3.27

2015-08-07

2015-02-28

2015-12-13

NA

2.28

1.90

2.69

2015-08-27

2015-04-02

2015-12-24

MP

2.28

1.89

2.70

2015-03-31

2014-06-28

2015-11-13

NS

2.00

1.56

2.46

2015-06-30

2014-11-30

2015-12-24
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The sampling time of the most closely related strain for NP gene segment does
not overlap with the estimated TMRCA (between February 28, 2015 and August 7, 2015)
(Figure 14, Table 5), suggesting a gap in surveillance and that neither Ohio/14OS2209
nor Ohio/14OS2210 are the direct predecessor of H7N8 turkey strains. This observation
is consistent with the genetic distance separating H7N8 turkey strains from other viruses
in the NP phylogenetic tree
(Time_scale_phylogenetic_trees_for_eight_gene_segments.pdf).
Gene Constellation of H4N8 Virus in Diving Ducks Contributed to Emergence of
The Novel H7N8 Virus
We investigated possible genetic events that contributed to generation of the
H7N8 precursor virus in wild birds. The phylogenetic network showed that, in addition to
Kentucky/AH0012935, a group of H4N8 IAVs isolated from diving ducks (referred to as
H4N8–DD) during 2011–2014 were closely related, across six gene segments, to the
H7N8 turkey strains (Figure 15). Further examination of the eight gene segment–specific
phylogenetic trees indicated that the H4N8–DD viruses had five gene segments (PB2,
PB1, NA, MP, and NS) closely clustered with the H7N8 turkey strains. The NA, MP, and
NS genes of H4N8–DD viruses consistently formed a monophyletic clade with those of
the H7N8 turkey strains in phylogenetic trees (Figure 13,
Time_scale_phylogenetic_trees_for_eight_gene_segments.pdf). The PB2 gene of H4N8–
DD viruses isolated in 2014 and that of the H7N8 turkey strains, and PB1 gene of H4N8–
DD viruses isolated in 2012 and 2014 and that of the H7N8 turkey strains were
phylogenetically closely related
(Time_scale_phylogenetic_trees_for_eight_gene_segments.pdf).
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Figure 15

Phylogenetic network of H7N8 viruses detected in Indiana turkeys in red
font.

The network was reconstructed by concatenating sequences of six internal gene segments
for each virus strain. Strain names are color-coded with the host group colors of Figure
13. The highly pathogenic H7N8 strain detected in Indiana turkey is marked with an
asterisk. H4N8 influenza A viruses isolated from diving ducks in 2011, 2012, and 2014
are indicated by purple, blue, and green shade, respectively. Host species are: AGWT
(american green winged teal), BUFF (bufflehead), BWTE (blue winged teal), COGO
(common goldeneye), GRSC (greater scaup), LESC (lesser scaup), MALL (mallard),
NOSH (northern shoveler), TK (turkey), and WODU (wood duck). Geographic locations
are: IL (Illinois), IN (Indiana), KY (Kentucky), LA (Louisiana), MN (Minnesota), OH
(Ohio), TX (Texas), and WI (Wisconsin).
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To better understand the contribution of H4N8–DD viruses to the generation of
the H7N8 precursor virus, we assigned genotypes to H4N8 IAVs based on the results of
phylogenetic analyses. We analyzed the temporal dynamics of gene constellations that
possessed at least one gene segment that was assigned to the same cluster as a gene
segment in the H7N8 turkey strains. Gene constellation A possessed three gene segments
(NA, MP, and NS) that were of the same genotype as those in the H7N8 turkey strains;
this constellation was first detected at the end of 2011 and persisted for the next three
years (Figure 16). Gene constellation B possessed the same three H7N8–like gene
segments as constellation A plus an H7N8–like PB1 gene segment; this constellation was
first detected at the end of 2012 and continued to exist in H4N8–DD viruses isolated in
2014. Gene constellation C possessed five H7N8–like gene segments (PB2, PB1, NA,
MP, and NS) and was first detected in late 2014. The close genetic relationship between
H4N8–DD viruses and the H7N8 HPAI turkey strain at these five gene segments was
supported by high nucleotide sequence identities (>99.00%) (Table 6). Taken together,
these results provide evidence that gene constellations of H4N8 IAVs isolated primarily
from diving ducks contributed to the generation of a H7N8 precursor virus in wild birds.
Furthermore, a relatively persistent gene constellation possessing H7N8–like gene
segments emerged in or before 2011 and apparently acquired additional gene segments
closely related to the H7N8 outbreak strain during 2011–2014.
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Maximum likelihood phylogenetic tree for N8 gene segment of the H7N8 viruses detected in Indiana turkeys and
H4N8 influenza A viruses isolated from wild birds.

H7N8 strains associated with the outbreak of disease in Indiana turkeys are indicated in red and the highly pathogenic strain is
marked with an asterisk. Genotype of each strain is shown to the right of the tree, with eight columns of blocks representing
eight gene segments (from left to right, PB2, PB1, PA, HA, NP, NA, MP, and NS). Distinct colors denote the cluster
assignment and color code among different columns are independent. Grey indicates gene segment that are not same to the
H7N8 turkey strains in genotyping analysis. Three gene constellations, A, B, and C are indicated by purple, blue, and green
box, respectively.

Figure 16
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H4N8

A/bufflehead/Wisconsin/11OS3570/2011
H4N8

H4N8

A/common goldeneye/Wisconsin/11OS4503/2011

A/bufflehead/Illinois/4016/2009

H4N8

N8

A/bufflehead/Illinois/12OS4798/2012

A/common goldeneye/Wisconsin/11OS5764/2011

H4N8

A/ bufflehead /Illinois/14OS3567/2014
H4N8

H4N8

A/bufflehead/ Illinois /14OS3609/2014

A/bufflehead/California/3118/2011

H7N8

A/lesser scaup/Kentucky/AH0012935/2015

11-28-2009

10-30-2011

11-20-2011

12-4-2011

12-7-2011

11-23-2012

11-15-2014

11-16-2014

11-28-2015

1-14-2016

Subtype Sampling date
H7N8

Virus

0.9000

0.9790

0.9798

0.9790

0.9794

0.9776

0.9969

0.9947

0.9987

PB2

0.9701

0.9780

0.9776

0.9776

0.9736

0.9947

0.9965

0.9943

0.9987

PB1

0.9154

0.9805

0.9828

0.9823

0.9066

0.9809

0.9791

0.9786

0.9995

PA

0.9886

0.9285

0.9292

0.9299

0.9446

0.9315

0.9352

0.9352

0.9305

NP

0.9844

0.9767

0.9915

0.9915

0.9915

0.9946

0.9958

0.9908

0.9979

NA

0.9786

0.9929

0.9929

0.9919

0.9919

0.9929

0.9919

0.9888

0.9745

MP

0.9451

0.9881

0.9869

0.9881

0.9881

0.9928

0.9952

0.9917

0.9952

NS

Sequence identity between A/turkey/Indiana/16-001403-1/2016 and influenza A virus strains isolated from diving
ducks.

A/turkey/Indiana/16-001403-1/2016

Table 6

IAVs From Diving Ducks Are The Probable Genetic Source of The H7N8 Virus in
Indiana Turkeys.
Our phylogenetic and genotyping analyses provided evidence that IAVs isolated
from diving ducks may have contributed to the generation of the H7N8 virus that was
detected in Indiana turkeys. Using discrete phylogeographic analyses, we sought to
further understand if diving ducks were the most likely source of H7N8 turkey strains.
Results showed significant diffusion pathways from diving ducks to domestic turkey
flocks in Indiana for seven gene segments: transition with decisive support was observed
for the NS gene segment; strongly supported transition was observed for the PB2, PB1,
HA, and NA gene segments; and supported transition was observed for the PA and MP
gene segments (Figure 17, Table 7, Phylogenetic_trees_for_eight_gene_segments.pdf).
No significant transition for NP gene segment was observed between any wild bird
species and Indiana turkeys (Figure 17, Table 7,
Phylogenetic_trees_for_eight_gene_segments.pdf). In total, the resulting transition
patterns suggested IAV gene flow from diving ducks to Indiana turkeys and provide
evidence that IAVs from diving ducks were the most likely genetic source of the H7N8
virus that was detected in turkeys in Indiana.
To gain insight into the gene flow pattern of IAVs among various wild bird
species, we examined the diffusion pathways among different host groups. Bidirectional
transmission was observed between dabbling duck and diving duck, and between
gull/tern and shorebird; and gene transmission from diving duck to goose/swan was also
observed (Table 8), suggesting extensive mixing of IAVs between these bird species
groups in wild birds.
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Figure 17

Diffusion of influenza A virus between different host groups of wild birds
and Indiana turkey.
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Figure 17 (continued)
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Figure 17 (continued)
(a) – (h) are maximum clade credibility phylogenetic trees for eight gene segments. The
trees are constructed on the basis of the maximum clade credibility phylogenetic trees
shown in Phylogenetic_trees_for_eight_gene_segments.pdf. (I) summarizes the diffusion
pathway of influenza A virus between diving duck and Indiana turkey.
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Table 7

Diffusion pathway of influenza A virus between wild birds and Indian
turkeys.

Segment

Host group

Transition rate

Indicator

Bayes factor

Support level

PB2

Diving duck

0.70

0.82

24.12

Strong support

PB1

Diving duck

0.57

0.73

14.39

Strong support

PA

Diving duck

0.73

0.65

9.99

Support

HA

Diving duck

0.93

0.80

24.81

Strong support

NP

No significant transition was observed

NA

Diving duck

0.44

0.92

37.89

Strong support

MP

Diving duck

0.68

0.55

3.91

Support

NS

Diving duck

0.35

1.00

1045.21

Decisive

89

90

MP

NA

NP

HA

PA

PB1

PB2

Segment

Table 8

Diving duck
Dabbling duck
Diving duck
Dabbling duck
Diving duck
Dabbling duck

Diving duck

Dabbling duck

Diving duck

Dabbling duck

Diving duck

Gull Tern

Dabbling duck

Goose Swan

Diving duck

Dabbling duck

Shorebird

Goose Swan

Diving duck

Diving duck

Dabbling duck

Diving duck

Dabbling duck

Diving duck

Diving duck

Gull Tern

Dabbling duck

Shorebird

Gull Tern

Diving duck

Dabbling duck

Shorebird

Bird-B

Bird-A

1.11

0.35

1.13

0.39

1.36

0.24

0.93

1.14

0.28

2.13

1.84

0.62

0.34

1.05

1.19

0.54

Transition rate

0.56

0.94

0.74

0.83

0.57

0.92

1.00

0.57

0.94

0.97

0.66

1.00

1.00

0.52

0.55

0.73

Indicator

4.07

53.01

9.33

15.97

6.85

62.62

50232.67

8.49

100.76

192.56

10.46

142441.30

1113.82

5.61

6.50

14.51

Bayes factor

Diffusion pathway of influenza A virus among different host groups in wild birds

Support

Strong support

Support

Strong support

Support

Strong support

Decisive

Support

Very strong support

Very strong support

Strong support

Decisive

Decisive

Support

Support

Strong support

Support level

H7N8 LPAI Virus Evolved Into An HPAI Strain In Turkeys
We also investigated how the H7N8 virus evolved into a highly pathogenic form
after its introduction into domestic turkeys. The cleavability of HA protein is considered
a major determinant of pathogenicity, although the pathogenicity of IAVs is polygenic.
We investigated the sequence in the cleavage region of the HA protein of H7N8 turkey
strains. Indiana/16-001403-1 has a three basic amino acids (KRK) insert at the cleavage
site that results in a protein sequence motif: PENPKKRKTRGLF (Figure 18). The other
two H7N8 turkey strains, Indiana/16-001573-2 and Indiana/16-001574-7, have an
identical and typical LPAI cleavage site with no insert. Analyses of H7 HPAI strains
from previous outbreaks in the Americas identified multiple insertion patterns and
insertions of six to ten amino acids (Figure 18). Comparison showed that the novel H7N8
HPAI strain has a unique cleavage site different from earlier H7 HPAI strains in the
Americas.
Comparison of the genome of H7N8 HPAI strain and those of the two H7N8
LPAI turkey strains identified five amino acid substitutions in five distinct proteins
(Figure 19). Moreover, five amino acid substitutions in three different proteins were
detected between the genome of three H7N8 turkey strains and that of
Kentucky/AH0012935 (Figure 19). The profile of three amino acid positions (E105K,
F260L, and E278K [H3 numbering]; 95, 251, and 269 [H7 numbering]) in the HA1
protein were analyzed for all H7 IAVs isolated from wild and domestic birds in the
influenza database. It is interesting that amino acid K at position 278 [H3 numbering] in
the HA1 protein was observed in one poultry–origin isolate,
A/chicken/Guanajuato/07437-15/2015(H7N3), which presents multiple basic amino acids
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in the HA protein cleavage region. Amino acid K was also observed in six H7N3 HPAI
strains isolated during an outbreak in Pakistan in 2004. These amino acid substitutions
were potentially linked to the host adaptation of H7N8 viruses from wild waterfowl to
turkey and evolution from low pathogenic to highly pathogenic form.

Figure 18

Insertion patterns in the HA cleavage region of the H7 viruses detected in
Indiana turkeys and those from four previous outbreaks in the Americas.

The H7N8 viruses detected in Indiana turkeys are indicated in red, highly pathogenic
avian influenza viruses isolated from previous outbreaks are indicated in green. Wild
bird-origin influenza A viruses containing HA gene segment that is most closely related
to outbreak strains are indicated in black. Insert of basic amino acids are color-coded
accordingly. Host species are: BWTE (blue winged teal), CITE (cinnamon teal), CK
(chicken), GADW (gadwall), LESC (lesser scaup), REDH (redhead), and TK (turkey).
Geographic locations are: AZ (Arizona), BC (British Columbia), IN (Indiana), KY
(Kentucky), OH (Ohio), SK (Saskatchewan), and TX (Texas).
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Figure 19

Amino acid substitutions among eight gene segments of the H7N8 strains
detected in Indiana turkey.

The position of amino acid substitution between Kentucky/AH0012935 and the H7N8
turkey strains are shown in bold, and other positions represent amino acid substitutions
between the highly pathogenic avian influenza H7N8 strain and two low pathogenic
avian influenza H7N8 strains associated with the outbreak of disease in Indiana turkeys.
Amino acids are colored-coded on the basis of Rasmol coloring scheme in CLC sequence
Viewer 7, and colors represent the different properties of amino acids. Host species are:
LESC (lesser scaup) and TK (turkey). Geographic locations are: IN (Indiana) and KY
(Kentucky).
Discussion
Introduction of IAVs from wild birds to domestic poultry presents a continuous
threat to livestock health. In this study, we provided evidence that the H7N8 virus
associated with the outbreak of disease in Indiana turkeys was generated through a series
of genetic events likely occurring in wild birds and subsequently introduced into an
Indiana turkey flock, where the virus evolved into a highly pathogenic form.
We propose one possible evolutionary model leading to the generation of H7N8
HPAI virus in Indiana turkeys on the basis of available evidence and emphasize that other
models cannot be excluded. The H7N8 precursor virus may have been generated in wild
birds through two phase sequential reassortment events (Figure 20). The first phase of
reassortment may have occurred between H4N8–DD viruses and other IAVs circulating
in North American wild birds during 2011–2014, generating
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A/Bufflehead/Illinois/14OS3609/2014–like virus, possessing five H7N8–like gene
segments (PB2, PB1, NA, MP, and NS), in diving ducks. In the second phase, further
reassortment between A/Bufflehead/Illinois/14OS3609/2014–like virus and locally
circulating IAVs in wild birds that have H7N8–like PA, HA, and NP gene segments lead
to the generation of H7N8 precursor virus. Although the direct predecessor virus of the
H7N8 turkey viruses could not be identified, we identified one IAV strain that possess six
gene segments most closely related to that of the H7N8 HPAI virus, with nucleotide
sequence identity ≥99.00%, in a diving duck sampled in Kentucky. IAVs that are most
closely related to the H7N8 turkey strains, including Kentucky/AH0012935 and H4N8–
DD isolates, were mainly recovered from samples collected in Kentucky, Wisconsin,
Illinois, Ohio, and Louisiana, all of which are included within the Mississippi flyway. In
addition, sample collection sites for IAVs isolated from diving ducks included locations
within all four major flyways of North America (Figure 21). Thus, we predict that the
reassortment events leading to the generation of H7N8 precursor viruses likely occurred
within the Mississippi flyway. Regarding the time of introduction of H7N8 virus to
Indiana turkeys, we observed that the TMRCAs for three H7N8 turkey strains among
seven of eight gene segments were summer and fall of 2015. In North America,
waterfowl generally begin staging for autumn migration in July and August. Southern
migration begins as early as August for blue-winged teal and for most waterfowl in late
September, October, and early November. It was likely that waterfowl, including diving
ducks, may have carried the H7N8 precursor virus during their southern migration and
introduced this virus to Indiana turkeys through an unidentified interface between wild
waterfowl and domestic poultry. After introduction to Indiana turkeys, H7N8 LPAI virus
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evolved into highly pathogenic form through acquisition of three basic amino acids
(KRK) in the cleavage region of the HA protein.
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Influenza A viruses are represented by ovals containing horizontal bars that indicate eight gene segments (from top to bottom, PB2, PB1,
PA, HA, NP, NA, MP, and NS). Solid ovals represent virus strains isolated from wild and domestic birds, and broken ovals represent
hypothetical virus strains. A broken bar in segment four (HA) indicates insert of basic amino acids at the cleavage site. HPAI = highly
pathogenic avian influenza, and LPAI = low pathogenic avian influenza. A, B, and C indicate three gene constellations shown in Figure 16.
Genetic events occurring in wild and domestic birds are indicated by blue and red shaded boxes, respectively.

Figure 20 Proposed evolutionary pathway leading to the generation of highly pathogenic avian influenza(H7N8) virus that
caused outbreak in Indiana turkeys.

Figure 21

Statistics of influenza A viruses isolated from wild and domestic birds in the
Americas.

(a) Distribution of 8,845 influenza A virus strains isolated from wild and domestic birds
in the Americas among different bird groups. (b) Distribution of 133 influenza A virus
strains isolated from American diving ducks among four bird migratory flyways and
South America. (c) Distribution of 133 influenza A virus strains isolated from American
diving ducks among different sampling years.
Worldwide, LPAI viruses have been recovered from at least 105 wild bird species
representing 26 different taxonomic families (33). Most of the 26 families are in the
Order Anseriformes (including ducks, geese, and swans), followed by the Order
Charadriiformes (including shorebirds and gulls); both are considered major natural
reservoirs for IAVs (4). Among these bird species, shorebirds and gulls were previously
suggested to be the source of the precursor of H5 and H7 HPAI viruses in North America
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(225). A more recent study indicated that the precursors of H7N3 HPAI viruses in the
Americas most likely originated from wild waterfowl, particularly dabbling ducks (194).
In Eurasia, precursors of H7 HPAI viruses were generally found in dabbling ducks (195).
Our findings add to the knowledge supporting that introduction of IAVs from wild birds
plays an important role in the emergence of IAVs in domestic poultry. This study differs
from previous work, though, in providing evidence that diving ducks may also contribute
to the emergence of a HPAI strain as compared to dabbling ducks, shorebirds and gulls,
and other bird species. Diving ducks appeared to have contributed five gene segments
(PB2, PB1, NA, MP, and NS) to the novel H7N8 virus, may have harbored the H7N8
LPAI precursor virus; however, the mechanism of exposure to Indiana turkeys remains
unclear. The behavior of diving ducks may contribute to the long-term perpetuation of
specific IAV genes or strains. Compared with dabbling ducks and many other birds,
diving ducks utilize open water habitats that can include deeper water. It has been shown
that IAVs may remain infectious in water for several months (41), but infectivity is
adversely affected by repeated freeze-thaw cycles that would be more likely to occur at
the shallower water utilized by dabbling ducks (226). In aquatic habitats highly
contaminated by waterfowl feces, deeper water habitats that undergo limited or no freezethaw cycles could also increase the risk for IAV co-infection, which could lead to virus
reassortment and the generation of novel IAV strains as occurred with the H7N8
precursor viruses.
Mutation and reassortment have been two major mechanisms for IAVs to
maintain circulation and expand host ranges. Reassortment events have been well
documented for IAVs that infect humans, swine, equine, canines, and wild and domestic
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birds. Persistence of a gene constellation has been shown to be associated with
emergence of novel IAV strains that infect mammals. The existence of triple-reassortant
internal gene constellations has been well established in multiple subtypes of IAVs that
infect swine, and such constellations contributed to the genesis of the pandemic influenza
A(H1N1) pdm09 virus (95). This internal gene constellation was suggested to possess a
selective advantage over other strains (227). In contrast, IAVs that infect wild birds
generally form diverse and transient genotypes through reassortment of functionally
equivalent gene segments (48). Specific studies devoted to H7 IAVs in wild birds
inhabiting North America and Eurasia found similar patterns (196, 219). In addition,
extensive gene flow between IAVs in North American wild birds could further facilitate
genetic diversity, although the migratory flyway and geographic distance may impose
short-term restrictions on gene flow (228, 229). We observed that as many as five H7N8–
like gene segments (PB2, PB1, NA, MP, and NS) formed a relatively persistent gene
constellation in H4N8 IAVs isolated from diving ducks. This finding suggests that
reassortment between IAVs in wild birds may not be random: some gene segments may
be more likely to form specific linkages within the context of diverse and transient
genotypes. Alternatively, reassortment may be restricted in some groups of birds, like
diving ducks, if prevalence and the probability of infection with two or more viruses is
unlikely. The significance of the relatively persistent gene constellation, within the
context of transient genotypes of IAVs in wild birds, observed in this study is not known.
Influenza surveillance in wild birds is critical for understanding the natural history
of IAVs and assessing the ancestry of IAVs infecting domestic poultry, however, the
existing surveillance system in wild birds could have led to considerable bias toward bird
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species that are present in large numbers in nature or that are easily caught (33). Diving
ducks are underrepresented in both historic and current IAV surveillance. We
investigated the host origin of genomic sequences deposited in the Influenza Research
Database (220) and found that diving duck-origin strains comprise around 1.50% of the
total number of IAV strains isolated from wild and domestic birds in the Americas
(Figure 21). Among the 441 IAV strains that we sequenced in this study, only six
originated from diving ducks (Figure 11). In addition, data from a large scale surveillance
program in wild birds throughout the United States showed that, among the 197,885
samples collected from over 200 wild bird species (2007–2011), diving ducks accounted
for only 7.72% of all samples collected and 3.58% of the IAV positive samples
determined by M gene based rRT-PCR; dabbling ducks accounted for 62.73% of the
samples collected and 86.44% of the IAV positive samples (230). Although data from the
same study showed that the IAV positive rate for diving ducks was 5.30% compared to
15.80% for dabbling ducks, our study highlights the contribution of diving ducks to the
emergence of the novel H7N8 virus and suggests that diving ducks may serve as a
potentially unique IAV reservoir or uniquely contribute to the maintenance,
diversification, and transmission of IAVs in wild birds. Thus, we recommend additional
surveillance sampling of diving ducks and other bird species of specific ecological
significance for IAVs, but acknowledge the difficulty in obtaining these samples from
hunter harvested birds since dabblers are usually the preferred bird species of hunters.
Moreover, we observed a relatively persistent gene constellation that may be associated
with the emergence of the novel H7N8 virus. Genome sequencing and characterization of
gene constellation of IAVs in wild birds could serve as a valuable component of a
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successful surveillance strategy. The genomes of 441 wild bird–origin IAVs were
sequenced in a collaborative effort in this study. This large number of IAV isolates and
sequences enabled us to conduct detailed evolutionary analyses and revealed a few key
aspects regarding the evolutionary pathway leading to the novel H7N8 virus. The
experience from this study demonstrates the need for a coordinated, systematic, and
collaborative approach to active surveillance in wild birds.
In summary, our investigation provides information on the putative viral
ancestors, possible evolutionary pathways, and probable host species involved in the
emergence of a novel H7N8 virus that caused outbreaks among turkey flocks in Indiana
during 2016. Our findings indicate that diving ducks contributed to the emergence of the
novel H7N8 virus and may contribute to the maintenance, diversification, and
transmission of IAVs in wild birds. The repeated introduction of IAVs into domestic
poultry from wild birds highlights important gaps in existing biosecurity systems and
provides evidence that surveillance in wild birds can be useful for understanding possible
evolutionary pathways of emergence.
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THE ANTIGENIC DIVERSITY AND GENETIC EVOLUTION OF
CONTEMPORARY H7 AIVS FROM NORTH AMERICA
DURING 1971 to 2012
H7 AIVs have caused at least 500 confirmed human infections since 2003 and
culling of more than 75 million birds in recent years. Vaccine could serve as a valuable
component in a successful AIV control strategy, and antigenic match between vaccine
seed strain and circulating viral strains is one of the keys to a successful vaccination
program. However, limited data is available for the antigenic diversity of contemporary
H7 AIVs from North America. In this chapter, we antigenically and genetically
characterized 93 AIV isolates from North America (85 from wild birds [1976–2010],
seven from domestic poultry [1971–2012], and one from a seal [1980]). The
hemagglutinin genes of these H7 viruses are separated from those from Eurasia. Gradual
accumulation of nucleotide and amino acid substitutions was observed in the
hemagglutinin of H7 AIVs isolated from wild and domestic birds. Genotype
characterization suggested that H7 AIVs circulating in North American wild birds form
diverse and transient internal gene constellations. Serologic analyses showed that the 93
isolates cross-reacted with each other to different extents. Antigenic cartography showed
that the average antigenic distance among them was 1.14 units (standard deviation [SD],
0.57 unit) and that antigenic diversity among the H7 isolates we tested was limited. Our
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results suggest that the continuous genetic evolution has not led to significant antigenic
diversity for H7 AIVs from North America. These findings add to our understanding of
the natural history of IAVs and will inform public health decision-making regarding the
threat these viruses pose to humans and poultry.
Introduction
H7 AIVs have been frequently reported to cause outbreaks in domestic poultry
and humans. The first outbreak of HPAI H7 virus in Pakistan was reported in 1995, and
the threat to domestic poultry has persisted in the region since then (231, 232). In 2003, a
HPAI H7N7 outbreak in the Netherlands led to the death or culling of more than
30,000,000 birds and 89 infections in humans, one of which was fatal (19, 233). In March
2013, a LPAI H7N9 virus emerged in eastern China (177) and has become enzootic in the
region (234). The virus causes asymptomatic infection in domestic poultry, including
chickens and waterfowl, but high morbidity and mortality in human infections (235).
Since the emergence of H7N9 virus, more than 500 laboratory-confirmed cases in human
have been reported, of which more than 100 were fatal
(http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/influenza_h7n9/en/).
Furthermore, epidemics caused by H7N1 and H7N3 AIVs were reported in Italy during
1999–2004 (150, 189). H7 AIVs were also reported to cause outbreaks in domestic
poultry in Australia (236), Germany (237), and the United Kingdom (238). In North
America, H7N2 AIV was first identified in 1994 in the LPM system in the northeastern
United States, and during 1997–2002 it was linked with outbreaks among poultry in
Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and North Carolina(129, 181). HPAI H7N3
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viruses were responsible for outbreaks in poultry in Canada (in 2004 and 2007) and
Mexico (in 2012) (61, 239, 240), and subsequently spilled over to humans (64, 241).
The conventional strategy for controlling the spread of avian influenza outbreaks
in domestic poultry involves enforcement of biosecurity measures, diagnostics and
surveillance, and culling of infected birds. In addition, vaccination programs have been
implemented in multiple countries to control H7 AIV outbreaks among domestic poultry.
For example, in Italy, vaccine was used against H7N1 virus in 2000 and against H7N3
virus in 2002; vaccines have been used in Pakistan since 1995 to control H7N3 virus; and
in North America, vaccine was used against a 2003 H7N2 virus outbreak in Connecticut,
United States, and against the on-going H7N3 virus outbreak in Mexico. Early experience
showed that vaccine could serve as a valuable component in a successful AIV control
strategy.
IAVs evolve by two major mechanisms: mutation and reassortment. Point
mutations within surface glycoproteins HA and NA can lead to a small antigenic change,
so called antigenic drift. Reassortment refers to the exchange of individual gene segments
or combinations of segments between IAVs during mixed infections in the same cell. The
switch of HA and/or NA by reassortment can cause a large antigenic change, so called
antigenic shift. Reassortment occurs frequently between IAVs, and it facilitates
generation of epidemic and pandemic influenza strains. Both antigenic drift and antigenic
shift allow IAVs to evade the herd immunity established from previous influenza
infections or vaccination.
Earlier studies have showed minor antigenic diversity for wild bird-origin H7
AIVs from Eurasia (195, 196); however, limited data is available for antigenic diversity
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of contemporary H7 AIVs from North America. Understanding the antigenic diversity of
H7 AIVs circulating in North America will facilitate the detection of antigenic variants
and development of effective strategies for disease prevention and control. In this
chapter, we antigenically characterized 93 H7 AIVs derived from wild waterfowl,
domestic poultry, and a seal; the isolates were collected across North America during
1971–2012. The genomic sequences were analyzed to determine the genetic evolution
dynamics of H7 AIVs in North America.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
All experiments involved in animals were approved by Institutional Animal Care
& Use Committee, Mississippi State University (Project No. 13-090). All experiments
were carried out in accordance with the approved guidelines.
Viruses
A total of 93 H7 isolates were included in the study (Table 9): 85 were derived
from wild birds during 1976-2010, seven were derived from domestic poultry during
1971-2012, and one was derived from a seal in 1980. Among these isolates, A/cinnamon
teal/Mexico/2817/2006(H7N3) was the vaccine strain used during the vaccination
campaign against HPAI H7N3 virus in Mexico in 2012, strain A/chicken/British
Columbia/314514-2/2004(H7N3) was isolated from the outbreak in domestic poultry in
Canada in 2004, and strain A/chicken/Jalisco/CPA-12283/2012(H7N3) was from the
outbreak in Mexico in 2012. The wild bird-origin isolates represent those recovered from
Canada, Mexico, and 28 states within the United States. They also represent the four
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major bird migratory flyways in North America: the Atlantic, Central, Mississippi, and
Pacific flyway (Figure 22).
The isolates were propagated by using nine day old specific pathogen free chicken
embryonated eggs; the eggs were inoculated and incubated for 72 hours at 37°C before
the virus was harvested. Viruses were then aliquoted and stored at −80°C until use.
Generation of Reference Antisera in Chicken
A total of 15 H7 isolates were selected to generate reference antisera; the isolates
were selected to maximize the representative subtype and species diversity and
geographic and temporal coverage of the 93 isolates (Table 9). Three-week-old specific
pathogen free chickens were used to produce antisera. Chickens were inoculated
intranasally with 106 50% tissue culture infective doses of an H7 AIV isolate. If the sera
titers were ≥ 1:160 at two weeks post inoculation, the sera were collected at three weeks
post inoculation; if the viral titers were < 1:160 at two weeks post inoculation, the birds
were re-inoculated intranasally with 106 50% tissue culture infective doses of the same
H7 AIV isolate and the sera were collected at two weeks post re-inoculation. Blood was
collected from the chickens’ heart four weeks after the first inoculation. Serum was
separated from the erythrocytes after centrifugation at 2,000 rpm for ten minutes. All sera
were aliquoted and stored at −80°C until use.
HA and HI Assays
Before performing the HI tests, we treated the chicken antisera with 100% packed
chicken red blood cells to eliminate non-specific antigen reactions. The HA and HI
assays were performed in accordance with World Organisation for Animal Health
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guidelines. HI tests were carried out by using four hemagglutinin units and a 1% chicken
red blood cells suspension.
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Table 9

List of H7 AIVs isolated in North America that were subjected to antigenic
characterization.
Date
collected

Virus

Flyway

Subtype

A/American green-winged teal/Colorado/A00551331/2007a 10-Nov-07

Central

H7N3

A/northern shoveler/Utah/A00374996/2007

15-Dec-07

Pacific

H7N3

A/domestic duck/West Virginia/A00140912/2008

9-Jul-08

Atlantic

H7N3

A/domestic duck/West Virginia/A00140913/2008

9-Jul-08

Atlantic

H7N3

A/domestic duck/West Virginia/A00140915/2008

9-Jul-08

Atlantic

H7N3

A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325105/2008

6-Aug-08

Atlantic

H7N3

A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325108/2008

6-Aug-08

Atlantic

H7N3

A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325112/2008

6-Aug-08

Atlantic

H7N3

A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325114/2008

6-Aug-08

Atlantic

H7N3

A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325115/2008

6-Aug-08

Atlantic

H7N3

A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325117/2008

6-Aug-08

Atlantic

H7N3

A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325125/2008

6-Aug-08

Atlantic

H7N3

A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325129/2008

6-Aug-08

Atlantic

H7N3

A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325136/2008

6-Aug-08

Atlantic

H7N3

A/mallard/Wisconsin/A00465618/2008

5-Sep-08

Mississippi H7N3

A/blue-winged teal/Missouri/A00624483/2008

8-Sep-08

Mississippi H7N3

A/blue-winged teal/Missouri/A00624484/2008

8-Sep-08

Mississippi H7N3

A/mallard/Iowa/A00558620/2008

18-Oct-08

Mississippi H7N3

Isolates from wild birds

A/American green-winged teal/Colorado/A00660616/2008 9-Nov-08

Central

H7N3

A/mallard/South Dakota/A00649542/2008

Central

H7N3

19-Nov-08
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Table 9 (continued)
Date
collected

Flyway

Subtype

A/mallard/New Jersey/A00122457/2008

22-Nov-08

Atlantic

H7N8

A/mallard/Kansas/A00523306/2008

25-Nov-08

Central

H7N3

A/mallard/Indiana/A00142205/2008

26-Nov-08

Mississippi

H7N3

A/northern shoveler/Nevada/A00505416/2008

6-Dec-08

Pacific

H7N6

A/American green-winged
teal/Wyoming/A00230796/2008

7-Dec-08

Central

H7N3

A/bufflehead/Virginia/A00120022/2008

9-Dec-08

Atlantic

H7N2

A/northern shoveler/Oregon/A00654616/2008

22-Dec-08

Pacific

H7N3

A/northern shoveler/Mississippi/A00682947/2008

27-Dec-08

Mississippi

H7N7

A/American green-winged teal/Utah/A00833077/2009

2-Jan-09

Pacific

H7N3

A/American green-winged teal/Arizona/A00115994/2009

3-Jan-09

Pacific

H7N3

A/American green-winged teal/Arizona/A00115995/2009 3-Jan-09

Pacific

H7N3

A/American green-winged teal/Utah/A00831743/2009

3-Jan-09

Pacific

H7N3

A/gadwall/Arizona/A00663934/2009

3-Jan-09

Pacific

H7N7

A/northern shoveler/Mississippi/A00602284/2009

3-Jan-09

Mississippi

H7N2,N7

A/northern shoveler/Utah/A00831758/2009

8-Jan-09

Pacific

H7N3

A/American green-winged teal/Utah/A00654391/2009

9-Jan-09

Pacific

H7N3

A/American green-winged teal/Utah/A00461135/2009

15-Jan-09

Pacific

H7N1

A/American green-winged teal/Utah/A00461136/2009

15-Jan-09

Pacific

H7N1

A/American green-winged teal/Utah/A00614935/2009

15-Jan-09

Pacific

H7N3

A/mallard/Oklahoma/A00449368/2009

15-Jan-09

Central

H7N3

Virus
Isolates from wild birds
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Table 9 (continued)
Date
collected

Flyway

Subtype

A/mallard/Oklahoma/A00449455/2009

15-Jan-09

Central

H7N3

A/northern shoveler/Utah/A00461133/2009

15-Jan-09

Pacific

H7N4

A/northern shoveler/Utah/A00468752/2009

15-Jan-09

Pacific

H7N3

A/American green-winged teal/Utah/A00468772/2009

16-Jan-09

Pacific

H7N7

A/northern shoveler/Utah/A00468715/2009

16-Jan-09

Pacific

H7N6

A/northern shoveler/Utah/A00468766/2009

16-Jan-09

Pacific

H7N3

A/northern pintail/Texas/A00466052/2009

18-Jan-09

Central

H7N3

A/ring-necked duck/Texas/A00766403/2009

19-Jan-09

Central

H7N1

A/blue-winged teal/Louisiana/A00637297/2009

22-Jan-09

Mississippi

H7N3

A/American green-winged teal/Texas/A00604024/2009

3-Feb-09

Central

H7N3

A/American green-winged teal/Texas/A00604029/2009

3-Feb-09

Central

H7N3

A/American green-winged teal/Texas/A00604032/2009

3-Feb-09

Central

H7N3

A/American green-winged teal/Texas/A00604814/2009

3-Feb-09

Central

H7N3

A/blue-winged teal/Texas/A00605473/2009

13-Mar-09

Central

H7N3

A/blue-winged teal/Minnesota/A00137660/2009

27-Jul-09

Mississippi

H7N3

A/mallard/Montana/A00750842/2009

16-Sep-09

Central

H7N3

A/blue-winged teal/South Dakota/A00772794/2009

28-Sep-09

Central

H7N7

A/mallard/Michigan/A00869519/2009

14-Oct-09

Mississippi

H7N3

A/mallard/Nebraska/A00709657/2009

28-Nov-09

Central

H7N3

A/mallard/New York/A00723392/2009

12-Dec-09

Atlantic

H7N3

A/mallard/New York/A00723400/2009

12-Dec-09

Atlantic

H7N4

Virus
Isolates from wild birds
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Table 9 (continued)
Date
collected

Flyway

Subtype

A/mallard/Oklahoma/A00749161/2009

12-Dec-09

Central

H7N3

A/mallard/Oklahoma/A00744383/2009

13-Dec-09

Central

H7N3

A/northern shoveler/Oklahoma/A00744384/2009

13-Dec-09

Central

H7N3

A/mallard/Illinois/A00325439/2009

18-Dec-09

Mississippi

H7N3

A/mallard/Illinois/A00755320/2009

18-Dec-09

Mississippi

H7N3

A/mallard/New Jersey/A00926089/2010

17-Feb-10

Atlantic

H7N3

A/American black duck/Delaware/A00870108/2010

18-Feb-10

Atlantic

H7N3

A/blue-winged teal/Texas/A00463679/2010

10-Mar-10

Central

H7N3

A/duck/Alberta/49/1976

1976

H7N3

A/mallard/Ohio/421/1987

1987

H7N8

A/pintail/MN/423/1999

1999

H7N3

A/laughing gull/NJ/2455/2000

2000

H7N3

A/ruddy turnstone/DE/1538/2000

2000

H7N9

A/ruddy turnstone/DE/892/2006

2002

H7N3

A/cinnamon teal/Mexico/2817/2006

2006

H7N3

A/ruddy turnstone/NJ/207/2006

2006

H7N3

A/turkey/Oregon/1971

1971

H7N3

A/turkey/MN/38429/1988

1988

H7N9

A/turkey/NY/4450-4/1994

1994

H7N2

A/turkey/VA/SEP-67/2002

2002

H7N2

2003

H7N2

2004

H7N3

2012

H7N3

1980

H7N7

Virus
Isolates from wild birds

Isolates from domestic poultry

A/chicken/CT/260413-2/2003
A/chicken/British Columbia/314514-2/2004

b

A/chicken/Jalisco/CPA-12283/2012b
Isolate from seal
A/seal/MA/1/1980
a

Viruses used to generated reference antisera are in bold.
Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus.
Isolates’ name was colored-coded according to their genetic clusters. Red indicates virus
in cluster I, green indicates virus in cluster II, and blue indicates virus in cluster III.
b
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Figure 22

Geographic distribution of H7 AIVs selected for antigenic characterization.

The isolates represent strains from Canada, Mexico, and the United States. Triangles
indicate viruses isolated from wild birds, dots indicate viruses isolated from domestic
poultry, and the square indicates virus isolated from a seal. Map of North America with
US States and Canadian Provinces by FreeVectorMaps.com,
https://freevectormaps.com/world-maps/north-america/WRLD-NA-02-0003.
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Full Genome Sequencing
Viral RNA was extracted from the allantoic fluid of specific pathogen free
embryonated chicken eggs by using the QIAamp Viral RNA Kit (QIAGEN, Valencia,
CA) according to the manufacturer’s instructions. The full-length cDNA for eight
influenza gene segments was amplified by using a SuperScript One-Step RT-PCR kit
(Invitrogen, Grand Island, NY) with influenza virus–specific primers (242). PCR
products were separated by using agarose gel electrophoresis and purified by using a
QIAquick Gel Purification Kit (QIAGEN). Amplified viral DNA products were
quantitated by using a High Sensitivity DNA kit on an Agilent 2100 Bioanalyzer system
(both from Agilent Technologies, Santa Clara, CA). An equal amount of each sample was
used to prepare the sequencing library with the Illumina Nextera DNA Sample
Preparation Kit (Illumina, San Diego, CA, USA). Library samples were further
quantitated, normalized, and pooled together. Pooled library samples were sequenced by
using a MiSeq Reagent Kit v2 (500 cycles) on a MiSeq sequencer (Illumina); the
sequencing protocol suggested by the manufacturer was followed. When any gene
segment presented more than one copy of sequence, PCR was performed with
specifically designed primer to confirm the existence of multiple copies of sequences.
These sequences were excluded from further analysis. Sequences obtained in this study
are available in GenBank under accession numbers KU289738 to KU290331.
Genomic Assembly
Genomic assembly was conducted with the in-house influenza genome assembly
pipeline, which integrates quality trimming by Trimmomatic (198), de novo assembly by
Velvet (200), reference search by BLAST (201), and mapping by Bowtie v2.0 (199). In
113

brief, quality trimming was first conducted by using Trimmomatic, which trims bases
from both ends of each read if the quality falls below 30 and clips reads if the average
quality drops below 28 (in a sliding window of ten bases). Reads less than 100
nucleotides in length were not included in the downstream analyses. The quality-filtered
reads were then de novo assembled in Velvet to build long contigs, and resulting contigs
were searched against the Influenza Virus Resource (243) by using BLAST to select the
reference sequence. Quality-filtered reads were then mapped to the reference sequences
by using Bowtie v2.0. Last, consensus sequences were generated with a minimum 10fold mapping coverage and supported by at least 90% of reads at a given position. The
mapping profile was visualized by using the Integrative Genomics Viewer (244) and
manually checked to correct potential assembly errors.
Evolutionary Analysis
Phylogenetic trees were inferred by using the maximum likelihood method
implemented in RAxML v8.1.17 (245). A general time-reversible model of nucleotide
substitution and a γ-distributed rate variation among sites was applied throughout the
analysis. Sequence alignments were conducted by using MUSCLE v3.8 (222).
To understand the evolutionary history of the H7 gene of AIVs isolated from
North America, two rounds of phylogenetic analyses were conducted. In the first round,
all genomic sequences of the H7 gene from AIVs were downloaded from the Influenza
Virus Resource in March 2015. A total of 1,315 sequences were available after
combining these database sequences with sequences recovered in this study. Two major
lineages, North American and Eurasian, were identified from the topology of this
preliminary phylogeny. Sequences falling into the North American lineage were kept,
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and 19 sequences were selected to represent the Eurasian lineage. After that, 775
sequences were retained. In the second round, phylogenetic analysis was conducted on
the HA1 domain of these 775 nucleotide sequences for a clear comparison of the
antigenic and genetic profiles. Topological robustness of the tree was evaluated by 1,000
pseudo-replicates.
Two rounds of phylogenetic analysis were conducted to assess the evolutionary
history of the six internal gene segments of H7 AIVs circulating among wild birds in
North America. In the first round, 8,545 genomic sequences from 1,030 complete
genomes of H7 AIVs were downloaded from the Influenza Virus Resource. When
multiple copies of genomic sequences were present for one gene segment, the sequence
corresponding to the maximal length was reserved. These database sequences were
analyzed with complete genomes recovered in this study. A total of 1,098 complete
genomes were retained, and phylogenetic tree was inferred for each gene segment.
Topology of the phylogeny was supported by 100 pseudo-replicates. North American and
Eurasian lineages were identified from the tree topology. In the second round of analysis,
the phylogenetic tree was inferred for 316 complete genomes corresponding to wild bird–
origin isolates in the North American NA-WB lineage. Topology of the phylogeny was
supported by 1,000 pseudo-replicates. Genotypes were defined on the basis of the
phylogenetic tree of each gene segment. A monophyletic clade was identified by two
criteria: (1) it was supported by a bootstrap value above 60, and (2) all sequences in the
clade had an average genetic distance greater than 95%.
The extent of reassortment among the internal gene segments was determined on
the basis of the six gene segment phylogenetic trees for viruses in the NA-WB lineage. A
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maximum likelihood method was implemented to measure the congruence among these
trees. Each gene segment tree was fitted to six gene data sets in turn, and the log
likelihood value was obtained after optimizing model parameters and branch lengths. The
similarity in topology among six gene trees corresponding to the same dataset was
determined by the difference in log likelihood values. To put the distribution of log
likelihood value in context, 100 random trees were generated for each gene dataset. Log
likelihood values were obtained, using the same approach, after fitting them to the
reference gene dataset.
Inference of Amino Acid Sites under Positive Selection
Selection pressure for the HA gene segment was investigated by using codon
substitution models implemented in the Codeml program of PAML v 4.8 (246). The site
models were used, allowing the ratio of non-synonymous/synonymous substitution rates
(dN/dS) to vary among sites. Four different models were used: M1a, M2a, M7, and M8.
Likelihood ratio tests for two pairs of models (M2a versus M1a and M8 versus M7) were
conducted according to instructions in the manual. In the test, twice the log likelihood
difference between the alternative model and null model was calculated. Small p-values
(<0.01) lead to rejection of the null models. If null models were rejected, then Bayes
Empirical Bayes analysis was implemented for estimation of specific codons under
positive selection. Before analysis, identical sequences and sequences with ambiguous
positions were removed. The nucleotide sequences coding the HA1 protein were
analyzed.
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Molecular Dating
Molecular dating was conducted by using the Bayesian Markov Chain Monte
Carlo method implemented in BEAST v1.8.0 (223). A HKY85 nucleotide substitution
model, Bayesian skyline coalescent tree prior, and relaxed uncorrelated lognormal clock
model were applied. For each analysis, a chain length of 50 million steps was run and
2,000 samples were generated. The results were analyzed in Tracer v1.6
(http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/tracer/), and convergence was assessed with a cutoff of
200 for the effective sample size. The mean nucleotide substitution rate and time to the
most common ancestor were computed after 10% of the samples were removed as burnin, and the statistical uncertainty was evaluated by using the values of the 95% HPD.
Construction of the Antigenic Cartography and Molecular Characterization
Antigenic cartography was constructed on the basis of HI data by using
AntigenMap (247). Each entry in the HI table was normalized by dividing the maximum
HI value for the reference antiserum. Missing HI titers and those below the cutoff value
for low reactors were analyzed by low-rank matrix completion. An HI titer of ten was
used as the low-reactor cutoff in the HI assay. Antigenic distance between two antigens
was defined as the Euclidean distance between the HI values of the two viruses against
all the antisera. Each unit of the antigenic distance corresponded to a 2-fold change in HI
titer. Multidimensional scaling was used to project viruses to a 2-dimensional map by
minimizing the sum-squared error between map distance and antigenic distance.
Antigenic distance was subjected to hierarchical clustering analysis implemented in R
(https://www.r-project.org/) to determine the potential division of viruses.
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To investigate the difference in antibody binding site within the HA sequences,
the protein sequences of these isolates were aligned with the H3 protein sequences and
the antibody binding sites were annotated based on those in H3N2 influenza A virus as
shown previously (169). 135 amino acid positions corresponding to five antibody binding
sites A, B, C, D, and E in the H3 protein were identified.
Results
H7 HA Genes are Genetically Diverse
Phylogenetic analyses showed that HA gene of H7 AIVs was divided into two
geographically dependent lineages: Eurasian and North American (Figure 23,
Phylogenetic_tree_for_HA1_nucleotide_sequences_of_H7_AIVs.pdf). Sporadic
intercontinental gene flow between these two genetic pools was observed. Five H7
viruses isolated in North America fell into the Eurasian lineage, and at least two
independent introductions (in 1992 and 1994) were identified. AIVs
A/softbill/CA/33445-158/1992(H7N1) and A/softbill/California/33445-136/1992(H7N1)
were most closely related to A/non-psittacine/England-Q/1985/89(H7N7), sharing
nucleotide sequence identities of 96.3% and 96.4%, respectively. In addition,
A/softbill/California/13907-21/1994(H7N1) and A/Pekin
robin/California/30412/1994(H7N1) are closely related to a group of AIVs of the same
subtype isolated from wild birds in the Netherlands, Singapore, and England in 1994;
nucleotide sequence identities ranged from 97.8% to 99.4%. One H7 virus isolated in
China, A/duck/Guangdong/1/1996(H7N3), was grouped with bird-origin viruses from
North America and was genetically closely related to A/ruddy turnstone/Delaware
Bay/135/1996(H7N3), sharing a nucleotide sequence identity of 99.4%.
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Table 10

Sequence identity of HA1 protein of H7 AIVs from distinct genetic clusters
from North America.

% nucleotide/amino acid identity with viruses in genetic cluster
Genetic cluster I
II
III
I
94.0/96.8
88.0/90.4
89.4/94.9
II
96.1/95.7
89.5/92.0
III
95.6/98.0

Three major genetic clusters were identified in the North American lineage.
Cluster I comprised the viruses isolated from wild and domestic birds during the 1970s
into the early 1990s. From the available data, a clear temporal division was observed
around 1994: cluster II mainly comprised the domestic poultry-origin H7 viruses isolated
during1994–2006, and cluster III comprised the viruses recovered from wild and
domestic birds after 1993. The tree topology was supported by the sequence identities:
the average shared identities between HA1 nucleotide sequences within these clusters
were 94.0% (cluster I), 96.1% (cluster II), and 95.6% (cluster III), and the average
identities between viruses from one cluster and another were 88.0% (clusters I and II),
89.5% (clusters II and III), and 89.4% (clusters I and III) (Table 10).
Cluster I was estimated to emerge around 1969 (Table 12), and it circulated in
North America for 24 years before its extinction in 1993. This cluster included one
isolate recovered from a seal in 1980. Subtype H7N2 was the predominant subtype in
cluster II, and the H7N2 viruses were mainly isolated from the LPM system in the
northeastern United States and from commercial poultry farms in four US states
(Maryland, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Virginia). Cluster II was further divided
into two clades: II-1 and II-2. Clade II-1 mainly consisted of viruses isolated during
1994-1996, and clade II-2 consisted of viruses isolated during 1996-2006. A clear
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molecular difference separated these two clades: a deletion of eight amino acids at
positions 212–219 in the HA1 protein. Cluster II included A/New York/107/2003(H7N2),
which infected a human with suspected exposure to poultry (202). A similar 8-amino acid
deletion was also observed in the HA1 protein of this virus.
Cluster III represents the contemporary genetic pool of H7 AIVs in North
America, including viruses from wild birds and from outbreaks among domestic poultry.
H7 viruses isolated during individual outbreaks among domestic poultry formed
independent monophyletic clades in the phylogeny, suggesting that they originated from
separate introductions from wild birds (194). Three of the H7 viruses evolved into HPAI
viruses: A/chicken/Canada/314514-2/2005(H7N3), A/chicken/SK/HR00011/2007(H7N3), and A/chicken/Jalisco/CPA1/2012(H7N3). Another H7 introduction,
A/chicken/Delaware/10851/2014(H7N7), did not evolve into an HPAI virus.
Limited Antigenic Diversity among Tested H7 AIVs
Serologic analyses showed that the antisera generated against 15 selected isolates
cross-reacted with the tested H7 isolates to different extents (Table 11, Table 13).
Antigenic cartography showed no clear division of these isolates (Figure 23). The
average antigenic distance among these isolates was 1.14 units (SD, 0.57 unit), and each
unit represented a 2-fold change in HI titer. The hierarchical clustering method grouped
these viruses into one cluster at a distance of 1.46 units, except for one outlier,
A/laughing gull/NJ/2455/2000(H7N3). The average distance from the outlier to the
remaining isolates was 2.01 units. Viruses from three distinct genetic clusters were
grouped in this antigenic cluster; no clear correlation between the genetic diversity and
antigenic property was observed (Figure 23).
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Table 11

Virus
BUFF1
20022
80
80
80
80
80
160
80
20
20
160
40
20
160
40
160
40
40
80
160
40
40
40
80
80
80
10
40
40
80
20
20
40
80

MALL1
22457
80
80
160
160
80
160
320
80
80
160
160
160
160
160
640
160
40
160
320
40
40
40
80
320
160
10
80
160
160
40
40
80
160

MALL4
65618
80
80
160
80
80
320
80
40
40
160
40
160
160
80
320
80
40
160
320
80
80
80
80
160
320
320
80
80
320
40
40
80
80

Titer to chicken antiserum
AGWT
ABDU8 MALL7
551331
70108
50842
160
320
80
80
160
80
160
160
160
80
160
80
160
160
80
320
320
320
80
160
80
40
80
40
40
40
40
160
160
160
80
160
40
160
160
40
160
160
160
80
160
80
320
320
320
160
80
40
80
40
40
160
160
160
640
640
160
80
80
40
80
80
40
80
80
80
160
80
80
160
160
160
640
320
160
640
320
160
80
80
40
80
80
40
320
320
160
40
80
20
40
40
40
160
80
80
80
80
80
MALL7
09657
80
40
40
40
80
160
160
40
40
160
40
40
160
40
320
40
20
80
160
40
40
80
80
160
80
320
40
40
160
20
20
80
80

AGWT
115995
80
20
40
20
80
160
160
40
20
160
40
40
160
40
320
40
20
160
320
40
40
80
40
80
80
160
80
40
160
20
20
40
40

MALL5
58620
80
80
80
40
160
160
80
80
40
40
40
40
80
40
640
80
40
160
320
40
40
80
80
320
320
320
160
80
320
40
40
80
320

Cross-HI data obtained for testing H7 avian influenza viruses against representative chicken sera. The homologous
titers were underlined.

A/bufflehead/Virginia/A00120022/2008
A/mallard/New Jersey/A00122457/2008
A/mallard/Wisconsin/A00465618/2008
A/American green-winged teal/Colorado/A00551331/2007
A/American black duck/Delaware/A00870108/2010
A/mallard/Montana/A00750842/2009
A/mallard/Nebraska/A00709657/2009
A/American green-winged teal/Arizona/A00115995/2009
A/mallard/Iowa/A00558620/2008
A/mallard/Indiana/A00142205/2008
A/American green winged teal/Colorado/A00660616/2008
A/American green-winged teal/Utah/A00461136/2009
A/blue winged teal/Missouri/A00624484/2008
A/ring-necked duck/Texas/A00766403/2009
A/blue-winged teal/South Dakota/A00772794/2009
A/seal/MA/1/1980
A/chicken/CT/260413-2/2003
A/chicken/British Columbia/314514-2/2004
A/turkey/Oregon/1971
A/turkey/MN/38429/1988
A/chicken/Jalisco/CPA-12283/2012
A/turkey/VA/SEP-67/2002
A/turkey/NY/4450-4/1994
A/duck/Alberta/49/1976
A/pintail/MN/423/1999
A/laughing gull/NJ/2455/2000
A/ruddy turnstone/DE/1538/2000
A/mallard/Ohio/421/1987
A/cinnamon teal/Mexico/2817/2006
A/ruddy turnstone/DE/892/2006
A/ruddy turnstone/NJ/207/06
A/American green-winged teal/Arizona/A00115994/2009
A/blue-winged teal/Minnesota/A00137660/2009
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A/domestic duck/West Virginia/A00140912/2008
A/domestic duck/West Virginia/A00140913/2008
A/domestic duck/West Virginia/A00140915/2008
A/American green-winged teal/Wyoming/A00230796/2008
A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325105/2008
A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325108/2008
A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325112/2008
A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325114/2008
A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325115/2008
A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325117/2008
A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325125/2008
A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325129/2008
A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325136/2008
A/mallard/Illinois/A00325439/2009
A/northern shoveler/Utah/A00374996/2007
A/mallard/Oklahoma/A00449368/2009
A/mallard/Oklahoma/A00449455/2009
A/mallard/Delaware/A00456271/2009
A/northern shoveler/Utah/A00461133/2009
A/American green-winged teal/Utah/A00461135/2009
A/blue-winged teal/Texas/A00463679/2010
A/northern pintail/Texas/A00466052/2009
A/American green-winged teal/Mississippi/A00468514/2009
A/northern shoveler/Utah/A00468715/2009
A/northern shoveler/Utah/A00468752/2009
A/northern shoveler/Utah/A00468766/2009
A/American green-winged teal/Utah/A00468772/2009
A/northern shoveler/Nevada/A00505416/2008
A/mallard/Kansas/A00523306/2008
A/blue-winged teal/Louisiana/A00557206/2009
A/northern shoveler/Louisiana/A00557321/2009
A/American green-winged teal/Texas/A00586649/2009
A/northern shoveler/Mississippi/A00602284/2009
A/American green-winged teal/Texas/A00604024/2009
A/American green-winged teal/Texas/A00604029/2009
A/American green-winged teal/Texas/A00604032/2009
A/American green-winged teal/Texas/A00604814/2009
A/blue-winged teal/Texas/A00605473/2009
A/American green-winged teal/Utah/A00614935/2009

Table 11 (continued)
40
80
40
40
160
40
20
20
160
40
40
20
40
40
80
80
16
80
80
80
80
40
160
20
80
80
40
40
80
160
40
40
160
80
40
320
160
20
160

80
80
80
80
160
80
40
40
160
80
80
40
80
80
160
160
20
320
80
80
320
80
160
20
80
160
80
80
160
160
80
80
640
160
80
160
320
80
320

80
80
80
80
160
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
80
80
160
80
20
320
80
80
160
40
320
20
80
80
80
80
80
160
40
80
320
160
80
320
160
40
160

80
80
80
80
80
40
40
40
80
40
40
40
80
80
160
80
20
320
80
80
160
80
320
20
80
80
80
80
160
160
40
80
640
160
80
320
320
40
160

80
80
80
80
160
40
40
40
160
40
80
40
80
80
160
80
20
320
80
80
160
160
320
40
80
160
80
80
160
160
40
80
640
160
80
320
160
40
320

40
80
80
80
40
20
20
20
40
20
40
20
40
40
160
40
20
160
80
80
80
40
160
20
80
80
40
40
80
160
40
40
160
80
40
160
160
20
160

160
40
40
40
40
20
20
40
40
20
40
20
40
40
80
40
20
80
80
80
80
40
320
20
80
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
320
80
40
160
80
20
160

20
40
20
40
40
20
20
40
40
20
20
20
20
40
40
40
20
80
80
80
40
20
160
20
80
40
40
80
40
80
20
40
160
40
40
80
80
20
160

40
40
40
80
40
20
80
80
40
20
40
40
40
40
80
80
20
160
80
80
160
40
160
40
80
20
160
40
40
160
320
20
160
40
40
320
320
20
320
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160
20
40
80
80
80
80
40
160
20
40
80
80
40
80
160
80
40
80
80
160

80
160
80
160
80
320
80
320
80
80
80
160
320
80
320
160
160
160
320
160
320

40
160
40
80
80
80
80
80
320
40
80
80
80
40
160
160
320
160
80
40
320

40
160
40
80
80
80
160
80
320
40
160
160
80
40
160
160
320
40
80
80
320

160
160
40
160
80
160
160
80
160
40
160
160
160
80
320
160
160
160
80
80
320

40
160
20
80
80
80
80
80
320
20
80
80
80
40
160
160
160
160
80
40
160

20
40
20
40
40
80
40
80
160
20
40
160
80
40
80
40
160
40
80
40
80

20
20
20
20
40
160
20
80
160
20
40
160
80
40
80
40
160
40
80
20
80

20
160
40
40
40
160
40
80
640
40
64
320
320
40
160
40
160
20
320
40
80

Red indicates virus in cluster I, green indicates virus in cluster II, and blue indicates virus in cluster III.
Abbreviations: BUFF120022, A/bufflehead/VA/A00120022/2008(H7N2); MALL122457, A/mallard/NJ/A00122457/2008(H7N8);
MALL465618, A/mallard/WI/A00465618/2008(H7N3); AGWT551331, A/American green winged teal/CO/A00551331/2007(H7N3);
ABDU870108, A/black duck/DE/A00870108/2010(H7N3); MALL750842, A/mallard/MT/A00750842/2009(H7N3);
MALL709657, A/mallard/NE/A00709657/2009(H7N3); AGWT115995, A/American green winged teal/AZ/A00115995/2009(H7N7);
MALL558620, A/mallard/IA/A00558620/2008(H7N3); MALL142205, A/mallard/IN/A00142205/2008(H7N3);
AGWT660616, A/American green-winged teal/Colorado/A00660616/2008(H7N3);
AGWT461136, A/American green-winged teal/Utah/A00461136/2009(H7N1);
BWTE624484, A/blue-winged teal/Missouri/A00624484/2008(H7N3);
RNDU766403, A/ring-necked duck/Texas/A00766403/2009(H7N1);
BWTE772794, A/blue-winged teal/South Dakota/A00772794/2009(H7N7).

A/blue-winged teal/Missouri/A00624483/2008
A/American green-winged teal/Mississippi/A00630203/2009
A/blue-winged teal/Louisiana/A00637297/2009
A/mallard/South Dakota/A00649542/2008
A/American green-winged teal/Utah/A00654391/2009
A/northern shoveler/Oregon/A00654616/2008
A/gadwall/Arizona/A00663934/2009
A/blue-winged teal/Texas/A00676566/2009
A/northern shoveler/Mississippi/A00682947/2008
A/mallard/New York/A00723392/2009
A/mallard/New York/A00723400/2009
A/mallard/Oklahoma/A00744383/2009
A/northern shoveler/Oklahoma/A00744384/2009
A/mallard/Oklahoma/A00749161/2009
A/mallard/Illinois/A00755320/2009
A/American green-winged teal/Utah/A00831743/2009
A/northern shoveler/Utah/A00831758/2009
A/American green winged teal/Utah/A00833077/2009
A/mallard/Michigan/A00869519/2009
A/mallard/New Jersey/A00926089/2010
A/northern shoveler/Mississippi/A00630207/2009

Table 11 (continued)

Viruses isolated from wild and domestic birds lacked antigenic diversity. The
average antigenic distance among wild bird-origin isolates was 1.14 units (SD, 0.57 unit).
With the exception of one outlier, A/laughing gull/NJ/2455/2000(H7N3), hierarchical
clustering showed that these isolates merged into one cluster at a distance of 1.47 units.
The average antigenic distance among seven poultry-origin isolates was 1.13 units (SD,
0.71 unit). These viruses were grouped into one cluster, at a distance of 1.63 units, by the
hierarchical clustering method. Poultry-origin isolates were antigenically similar to those
from wild birds; the distance between poultry-origin isolates and the most antigenically
similar wild bird-origin isolates was 0.18–0.86 units.
Limited antigenic diversity was supported by the comparison of amino acid
sequence of the 135 residues corresponding to those in the reported antibody binding
sites in influenza HA protein. Results showed that the average shared identity among
tested isolates was 96.6%, and lack of divergence of these amino acid positions
(Amino_acid_variations_in_antibody_binding_sites_of_H7_AIVs.pdf).
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Figure 23

Comparison of genetic and antigenic evolution of H7 AIVs from North
America.

(A) Schematic phylogenetic tree of the HA1 nucleotide sequences of H7 AIVs. Boxes
represent the three major genetic clusters; branches corresponding to viruses subjected to
antigenic characterization are colored-coded as described in the key; the same color code
is used in (B). The Eurasian lineage (EU) is represented by the large black triangle, and
Am represents North American lineage. (B) Antigenic cartography constructed on the
basis of HI data. Each gridline (horizontal and vertical) represents a 2-fold difference in
HI titer.
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Genetic Evolution Dynamics of the HA Gene
To evaluate the genetic evolution dynamics for the HA gene of H7 AIVs isolated
from North America, we analyzed (in temporal order) the genetic distance from each
virus to A/turkey/Oregon/1971(H7N3), the oldest isolate in the phylogeny (Figure 24).
The average evolutionary rate on the nucleotide level was determined by the slope of the
linear regression line that fits the data. Viruses in cluster I demonstrated a gradual and
stable increase of genetic distance to A/turkey/Oregon/1971(H7N3). The regression line
for cluster I had a slope of 0.0061 (adjusted R2 = 0.88; p < 2.20E-16). The lack of
continuations from 1971 to 1976 was due to the limited sampling during that time period.
Viruses in cluster II evolved at a faster rate than those in cluster III (0.0052 [adjusted R2
= 0.82; p < 2.20E-16] vs. 0.00218 [adjusted R2 = 0.42; p < 2.20E-16], respectively).
Cluster II was separated into two clades at the 1996 time point, and an elevated increase
in genetic distance was identified at that time. To determine the fluctuation of
evolutionary dynamics in cluster II, we independently analyzed viruses in two clades.
Regression analysis showed that viruses in clade II-1 evolved faster than those in clade
II-2 (0.008 [adjusted R2 = 0.59; p < 4.07E-9] vs. 0.0046 [adjusted R2 = 0.67; p <2 .20E16], respectively). Cluster III consisted of viruses isolated from wild birds and individual
outbreaks among domestic poultry. To evaluate the evolutionary status for H7 AIVs in
wild birds more precisely, we conducted additional analyses for wild bird-origin viruses
in this cluster. The slope of the regression line was 0.0019 (adjusted R2 = 0.31; p <
2.20E-16), which is lower than that for the entire population.
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Comparison of temporal genetic and antigenic evolution dynamics for H7 AIVs from North America.

(A) Year-by-year analysis of genetic evolution dynamics. Genetic distances between each virus and A/turkey/Oregon/1971
(TK/71) were determined from phylogenetic analysis. Dashed line indicates linear regression fit for viruses in genetic clusters I
and III; solid lines indicate linear regression fit for two clades in genetic cluster II. (B) Same as panel A, but genetic distances
are characterized by the number of amino acid substitutions (aa subst.) in the HA1 protein. (C) Year-by-year analysis of
antigenic evolution dynamics. Antigenic distances were calculated from antigenic cartography. 71 (1971), and 16 (2016). In
panel B and C, dots indicate viruses isolated from domestic poultry, triangles indicate viruses isolated from wild birds, the
square indicates virus isolated from a seal, and crosses indicate virus isolated from human.

Figure 24

Similar analyses were conducted at the amino acid level by characterizing the
genetic distance by the number of amino acid substitutions (Figure 24). A consistent
evolution trend was observed for cluster I, which showed an average of 0.63 amino acid
substitutions per year (adjusted R2 = 0.70; p < 3.27E-14). Cluster II had an average
change of 1.47 amino acids per year (adjusted R2 = 0.71; p < 2.20E-16). A dramatic
increase in the number of amino acid substitutions was observed in 1996; this finding is
consistent with the observed deletion of eight amino acids in the HA1 protein at the same
time. However, viruses in clades II-1 and II-2 had a similar average rate of evolution. The
slopes of regression lines for these two clades were 0.80 (adjusted R2 = 0.26; p <
0.00044) and 0.78 (adjusted R2 = 0.46; p < 2.20E-16), respectively. The temporal
fluctuation of amino acid substitutions for viruses in cluster III was not well fitted by the
linear regression model. However, it was observed that the number of amino acid
substitutions in viruses isolated from poultry and humans is larger than that in wild birdorigin viruses.
Rates of mean nucleotide substitution and the time to the most recent common
ancestor were also estimated by using the Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo method
(Table 12). The mean evolutionary rate for the cluster I was estimated as 5.11 × 10−3
substitutions per site per year (sub/site/year) (95% HPD, 3.94–6.25 × 10−3). Cluster II
evolved at a higher mean evolutionary rate (5.34 × 10−3 sub/site/year; 95% HPD, 4.68–
6.11 ×10−3) than cluster III (4.84 × 10−3 sub/site/year; 95% HPD, 4.34–5.31 × 10−3). For
cluster II, the estimated evolutionary rate for a collection of viruses in clade II-2
decreased to 4.90 × 10−3 sub/site/year (95% HPD, 4.19–5.67 × 10−3). This result
suggested that cluster II experienced a higher evolutionary rate during 1994–1996 and a
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lower evolutionary rate afterwards. For cluster III, the estimated evolutionary rate for a
collection of wild bird-origin viruses was 4.60 × 10−3 sub/site/year (95% HPD, 4.10–5.11
× 10−3), which is lower than that for the entire cluster III population.
The corresponding analysis of antigenic evolution dynamics showed that
antigenicity was relatively stable during 1971–2012 (Figure 24). No clear correspondence
was observed between the genetic and antigenic evolution dynamics. Of the 93
characterized viruses, 72 were isolated in 2008 and 2009; the antigenic distances between
these viruses and A/turkey/Oregon/1971(H7N3) ranged from 0.86 to 3.12 units. The
antigenic distances between the other 21 isolates and A/turkey/Oregon/1971(H7N3) also
fall into this range.
Table 12

Genetic
cluster

Estimated rates of nucleotide substitution and time to most recent common
ancestor for H7 AIVs from distinct genetic clusters from North America.

Model

Substitution rate
(×10−3 substitutions/site/year)
Mean
95% HPDa
ESSb

TMRCA
(calendar year)
Mean
95% HPD

ESS

I

SRD06-UCL–Skylinec

5.11

3.94–6.25

347

1969

1963–1970

289

II

SRD06-UCL–Skyline

5.34

4.68–6.11

693

1993

1990–1993

406

IId

SRD06-UCL–Skyline

4.90

4.19–5.67

856

1996

1995–1996

1070

III

SRD06-UCL–Skyline

4.84

4.34–5.31

389

1992

1991–1992

780

IIIe

SRD06-UCL–Skyline

4.60

4.10–5.11

299

1992

1990– 1992

693

a

HPD: highest probability density.
b
Effective sample size.
c
SRD06: HKY substitution model; UCL: uncorrelated lognormal molecular clock,
Skyline Coalescent Bayesian Skyline tree model.
d
Includes only viruses isolated after 1996.
e
Includes only viruses isolated from wild birds.
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160
80
40
40
40
80
80
10
40
40
80
80
80
80
40
80
40

A/turkey/Oregon/1971

A/duck/Alberta/49/1976

A/seal/MA/1/1980

A/mallard/Ohio/421/1987

A/turkey/MN/38429/1988

A/turkey/NY/4450-4/1994

A/pintail/MN/423/1999

A/laughing gull/NJ/2455/2000

A/turkey/VA/SEP-67/2002

A/chicken/CT/260413-2/2003

A/chicken/British Columbia/314514-2/2004

A/cinnamon teal/Mexico/2817/2006

A/northern shoveler/Utah/A00374996/2007

A/bufflehead/Virginia/A00120022/2008

A/American green-winged teal/Arizona/A00115994/2009

A/blue-winged teal/Texas/A00463679/2010

A/chicken/Jalisco/CPA-12283/2012

40

320

80

80

160

160

160

40

40

10

160

80

40

160

160

320

320

MALL122457

80

160

80

80

160

320

160

40

80

320

320

80

80

80

80

160

320

MALL465618

80

160

160

160

160

320

160

80

80

640

640

160

80

80

160

160

640

AGWT551331

80

160

80

320

160

320

160

40

80

320

320

80

80

80

80

160

640

ABDU870108

40

80

80

80

160

160

160

40

80

160

160

80

40

40

40

160

160

40

80

80

80

80

160

80

20

80

320

80

80

40

40

40

160

160

MALL709657

40

40

40

80

40

160

160

20

80

160

80

40

40

40

40

80

320

AGWT115995

40

160

80

80

80

320

160

40

80

320

320

80

40

80

80

320

320

MALL558620

80

320

160

640

160

320

160

40

80

320

320

80

80

160

80

320

320

MALL142205

Titer to chicken antiserum generated against 15 selected isolates
MALL750842

40

80

40

160

80

320

80

40

40

320

160

160

40

80

80

160

40

AGWT660616

80

320

160

320

320

320

80

20

80

640

80

80

80

80

80

160

40

AGWT461136

40

80

40

80

40

160

80

20

40

160

80

40

40

20

20

80

160

BWTE624484

80

160

160

160

320

320

160

40

80

320

160

80

80

80

80

160

320

RNDU766403

160

320

160

320

320

320

320

40

80

640

320

40

80

160

160

320

640

BWTE772794

The 17 selected H7 AIVs represent the maximal temporal coverage of 93 viruses isolated during 1971-2012.
Abbreviations:
BUFF120022, A/bufflehead/VA/A00120022/2008(H7N2); MALL122457, A/mallard/NJ/A00122457/2008(H7N8); MALL465618, A/mallard/WI/A00465618/2008(H7N3);
AGWT551331, A/American green winged teal/CO/A00551331/2007(H7N3); ABDU870108, A/black duck/DE/A00870108/2010(H7N3); MALL750842,
A/mallard/MT/A00750842/2009(H7N3);
MALL709657, A/mallard/NE/A00709657/2009(H7N3); AGWT115995, A/American green winged teal/AZ/A00115995/2009(H7N7);MALL558620,
A/mallard/IA/A00558620/2008(H7N3);
MALL142205, A/mallard/IN/A00142205/2008(H7N3); AGWT660616, A/American green-winged teal/Colorado/A00660616/2008(H7N3);
AGWT461136, A/American green-winged teal/Utah/A00461136/2009(H7N1); BWTE624484, A/blue-winged teal/Missouri/A00624484/2008(H7N3);
RNDU766403, A/ring-necked duck/Texas/A00766403/2009(H7N1);BWTE772794, A/blue-winged teal/South Dakota/A00772794/2009(H7N7).

BUFF120022

Cross HI data obtained for representative H7 AIVs against chicken serum.

Virus

Table 13
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Natural Selection for HA Gene of H7 AIVs in North America
The selection pressure for the HA gene was investigated independently for each
of the three genetic clusters (Table 14). The mean dN/dS for cluster II (dN/dS = 0.1875–
0.2154) was higher than that for cluster III (dN/dS = 0.1232–0.1407). The HA gene of
viruses in clade II-2 had a lower mean dN/dS (0.1821–0.2121) than the entire population
in cluster II. This finding suggests that the purifying selection for cluster II was lower
during 1994–1996 than afterwards. Wild bird-origin isolates in cluster III were
considered separately, and the results showed that the mean dN/dS was lower than that for
the entire population in cluster III. This finding suggests that the purifying selection
pressure was greater for wild bird-origin viruses than for poultry-origin viruses. Overall,
the HA gene of H7 AIVs circulating in North America is under strong purifying
selection, although there is variation in selection pressure for distinct genetic clusters.
Amino acid position 189 (H3 numbering; H7 numbering, 180) in the HA1 protein
was found to be under positive selection for the wild bird-origin viruses in cluster III. The
amino acid profile of this position for H7 AIVs from Eurasia and North America was
analyzed. Viruses isolated from land-based poultry and waterfowl were considered
separately (Table 15). For viruses in the North American lineage, position 189 was found
to be highly polymorphic in genetic clusters I and III: three and five distinct amino acids
were observed, respectively, and T was the major amino acid in both clusters. HA gene in
cluster II showed a distinct and conserved profile for position 189; with only one
exception, S was the predominant amino acid. Amino acid profiles were also analyzed for
three H7 viruses isolated from humans in North America: A/NewYork/107/2003(H7N2),
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which is from cluster II, and A/Mexico/InDRE7218/2012(H7N3) and
A/Canada/rv504/2004(H7N3), which are from cluster III. Amino acid S was observed at
position 189 in A/NewYork/107/2003(H7N2), and amino acid T was observed in the
other two viruses. Amino acid S was not observed at position 189 of Eurasian lineage H7
AIVs.
Table 14

Selection pressure in HA1 protein of H7 AIVs from North America.

Genetic cluster, model
I
M1a
M7
II
M1a
M7
IIa
M1a
M7
III
M1a
M7
IIIb
M1a
M8
a

dN/dS

Positively selected sites (probability)

0.1048
0.0999
0.2154
0.1875
0.2121
0.1821
0.1407
0.1232
0.1242
0.1086

189c (99.7%)

Include only viruses isolated after 1996.
Include only viruses isolated from waterfowl.
c
H3 numbering.
b

Table 15

Amino acid polymorphism at position 189 (H3 numbering) in HA1 protein
for H7 AIVs from North America and Eurasia.

Genetic group

Species

NA Ia

Lb
W
L
W
L
W
He
L/W

NA II
NA III
NA human isolates
EAc
a

No. of
sequences
16
32
221
15
39
351
3
1,118

Relevant amino acidsNo. of corresponding amino acids
T
A/N/T
I/S
S
A/N/T
A/D/I/N/T
S/T
A/G/N/T

Genetic cluster I in North American lineage.
L, land-based poultry; W, waterfowl; H, human.
c
Eurasian lineage.
b
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16
5/4/23
1/220
15
1/6/32
11/48/1/20/271
1/2
670/1/1/446

Frequent Reassortment of Internal Genes of H7 AIVs in NA-WB Lineage
Panoramic phylogenetic analyses of all H7 complete genomes showed a clear
division of the two major lineages (North American and Eurasian) for each gene segment
(Figure 25). It is noteworthy that the topology of the NS gene segment phylogeny showed
a deep divergence between the A and B alleles: within each allele, virus isolated from
North America and Eurasia was separated. Phylogenetic analysis of internal genes in the
NA-WB lineage demonstrated a high level of heterogeneity (Figure 26). Multiple distinct
clades could be identified for each gene segment. The largest number of clades was
observed in the PB2 phylogeny, which had 14 clades. Phylogeny of PB1, PA, and NP
gene segments could be separated into 12 clades. Less genetic diversity was observed for
the matrix protein and NS gene segments, which had three and two distinct clades,
respectively.
The frequencies and patterns of reassortment of the six internal gene segments
were assessed by determining the congruence among each gene’s phylogenetic tree.
Results showed that the topologies of the internal gene trees were more similar to each
other than to random phylogenetic trees (Figure 27), suggesting that the internal gene
segments are not completely independent from each other. However, the dissimilarities in
tree topology were extensive. The most significant incongruence was observed between
NS and other gene segments; the NS gene tree was found to be closer in topology to
random trees rather than to the other five internal gene trees. These results indicate
frequent reassortment of the internal genes for H7 AIVs in lineage NA-WB; no clear link
among specific gene segments was observed.
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We assigned genotypes to viruses in the NA-WB lineage and analyzed the
dynamics of these genotypes. Because 91% of the viruses were isolated during 2001–
2013, our analysis was constrained to viruses from this time period. H7 AIVs in the NAWB lineage demonstrated diverse genotypes: we identified 104 distinct genotypes for the
internal gene constellation (Figure 28). Multiple genotypes were observed in the same
year, and the largest number of genotype (29) was observed in 2009. Internal gene
constellations were transient rather than stable, and no individual genotype existed
throughout 2001–2013. A total of 92 genotypes existed for only one year, and two
genotypes existed for the maximal time span of five years.
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Figure 25

Maximum likelihood phylogenetic trees for internal gene segments of H7
AIVs from Eurasian and North American lineage.

Black bars on the lower right indicate two alleles in the NS gene segment phylogenetic
tree. Bootstrap values estimated from 100 resamplings of the sequence data are shown
adjacent to selected nodes.
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Figure 26

Maximum likelihood phylogenetic trees for internal gene segments of H7
AIVs derived from wild birds in North America.

Boxes represent the genetic clades. Scale bars indicate substitutions per site.
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Figure 27

Congruence in topology among six internal gene segment phylogenetic trees
for H7 AIVs derived from wild birds in North America.

Each column represents the difference in log likelihood value when six internal gene
phylogenies and 100 random phylogenies were fitted to the same dataset. The difference
in log likelihood value for each gene phylogeny is indicated by a colored dot. Range for
random phylogenies is represented by two solid lines.
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Figure 28

Year-by-year analysis of the evolution dynamics of internal gene
constellations for H7 AIVs derived from wild birds in North America during
2001–2013.

Small black dots indicate gene constellations that existed for only one year. Larger
colored dots indicate gene constellations that were observed in multiple years; the span of
years is indicated by a dashed line between the dots, and colors indicate the number of
years constellations existed.
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Discussion
We genetically and antigenically characterized 93 H7 AIVs isolated from North
America. Our results show that H7 AIVs in North America have wide genetic diversity.
Gradual accumulation of nucleotide and amino acid substitutions is observed for the HA
gene of H7 AIVs isolated from wild and domestic birds. Our results also show a limited
antigenic diversity among the H7 viruses we tested.
In wild birds, the limited antigenic diversity for H7 AIVs is consistent with the
concept of evolutionary stasis (248). These results are consistent with those from other
studies of wild bird-origin H7 viruses in other regions. For example, a 2005 study showed
that four H7 AIVs isolated from mallards in Sweden and the Netherlands in 2000 and
2002 had relatively conserved antigenic properties (249). In addition, antigenic
differences between these mallard-derived H7 isolates and an HPAI H7N7 strain isolated
in the Netherlands in 2003 were within a 4-fold change. No significant antigenic
differences (i.e., within a 4-fold change) were observed for nine H7 AIVs isolated in Italy
and China during 1999–2005 (196); of the nine isolates, four were H7N7 viruses derived
from ducks in China in 2003, three were H7 isolates derived from mallards in Italy during
2001–2005, and two were H7 viruses derived from turkeys in Italy in 1999 and 2002.
Our molecular characterization results suggest that the genetic evolution pattern in
the isolates we tested is gradual and stable. The estimated mean rate of evolution for the
H7 gene of AIVs circulating among wild birds in North America is 4.60 × 10−3
sub/site/year, which is similar to the rate for Eurasian lineage H7 viruses (5.75 × 10−3
sub/site/year) (234). Selection analysis showed that the H7 gene is under strong purifying
selection in wild birds; however, no amino acids at known antibody binding sites were
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under positive selection. The limited antigenic diversity among the H7 isolates might be
associated with the absence of certain pattern recognition receptors in the immune
response system of wild birds. These receptors are triggered by influenza virus and could
initiate the activation of innate immune responses. A 2010 study (250) showed that the
presence of the retinoic acid–inducible gene 1 (RIG-I) in ducks induces the production of
IFN-β and expression of downstream IFN-stimulated antiviral genes; however, the
absence of RIG-I in chickens contributes to their increased susceptibility (compared with
that of ducks) to influenza virus. In addition, Toll-like receptors (TLR) induce the
expression of type I IFN and proinfammatory cytokines (251). TLRs 3,7,8, and 9
upregulate in naturally occurring influenza, and they are associated with innate virus
inhibitory and proinflammatory responses (252). TLRs in birds differ from those in
mammals. Furthermore, TLR9 is absent in avian species, and many TLRs in wild birds
have yet to be identified (253).
Vaccination is a key component of the control strategy for HPAI viruses.
However, antigenic variations in AIVs from domestic poultry have been reported, and
these variations seem to be caused by the use of vaccine in poultry flocks. In 2002,
poultry flocks across Italy were vaccinated to prevent an outbreak of H7N3 virus; the
vaccine contained an inactivated H7N1 AIV (i.e., a vaccine with the same HA subtype as
the outbreak virus but with an antigenically and genetically different NA subtype).
Antigenic characterization of a longitudinal collection of 41 isolates showed large
antigenic difference between viruses isolated before and after implementation of the
vaccination program (169). Antigenic change was mirrored by the simultaneous
appearance of four amino acid substitutions within the antibody binding sites, and one
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amino acid was positively selected after the use of vaccine. In addition, the poultry
vaccination program in Mexico has facilitated the antigenic evolution of HPAI H5N2
virus in that country. An outbreak of HPAI H5N2 virus was detected in 1994 in Mexico,
and a vaccination program, using inactivated vaccine, was implemented in 1995.
Phylogenetic analysis of 52 H5N2 viruses isolated during 1993–2002 showed that two
genetically different sub-lineages had emerged after introduction of the vaccine program
and replaced the early sub-lineages (168). Viruses in these two new sub-lineages had
undergone antigenic drift and acquired a more than 4-fold antigenic change from the
vaccine strain. Six amino acid substitutions located within antibody sites A, B, and C
were detected for these two novel sub-lineages. Similar changes were observed for the
emergence of an H5N1 influenza variant in China. Since September 2005, routine
vaccination programs against H5N1 virus in domestic poultry have been conducted
nationwide in China. However, results of serologic testing of serum samples from 1,113
chickens in Guangdong and Guizhou, China, suggested that among the vaccinated
poultry, protection against an FJ-like H5N1 variant was poor compared with that against
other co-circulating H5N1 viruses (254). The presence of vaccine pressure probably
selected the FJ-like H5N1 viruses, and these viruses became predominant in the region.
The change of antigenicity in these outbreaks was mirrored by the observed fast
rate of evolution. The H7N3 AIVs from the Italian epidemic were estimated to evolve at
a mean rate of 8.04 × 10 × 10−3 sub/site/year, whereas the evolutionary rates for two
emerging H5N2 sub-lineages in Mexico were estimated to be 12 × 10−3 and 10 × 10−3
sub/site/year, respectively. These evolutionary rates are significantly higher than those
reported for H7 and H5 viruses from domestic poultry in the absence of vaccine program,
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as exemplified by the range of evolutionary rates for H5N1 viruses isolated from
Thailand, Turkey, and Nigeria: 2.5 × 10−3 to 5.2 × 10−3 sub/site/year (166). The findings
from these studies (166, 168, 169, 254) suggest that the presence of vaccine pressure may
drive antigenic drift of AIVs in domestic poultry. In our study, antigenic cartography
showed that the average antigenic distance among seven poultry-origin H7 isolates was
1.13 units (SD, 0.71 unit). The limited antigenic diversity may be attributable to the
absence of large-scale vaccination programs against H7 AIVs in North America, with the
exception of Mexico. The estimated mean evolution rate for the H7 gene of AIVs from
domestic poultry in the United States was 5.34 × 10−3 sub/site/year. This rate is
significantly lower than that found in the presence of a vaccination program but similar to
that found in the absence of vaccine program.
Adaptations are required when IAVs are transmitted across species, including
from waterfowl to land-based birds (e.g., chickens and turkeys) (9). HA protein plays an
important role in host-cell recognition, and mutation in HA protein has been identified as
a major determinant of host shift to domestic poultry. Previous research identified two
amino acid substitutions in the HA1 protein for H7 AIVs after their introduction from
wild birds to domestic poultry (150). Furthermore, a 1997 study showed that evolution of
the HA gene could increase significantly after introduction into domestic poultry; the
evolution rate for the HA gene of H5 AIVs increased significantly after introduction into
domestic poultry in Mexico (255). Our results showed the same trend for the H7 gene of
AIVs from North America: the HA gene of poultry-origin H7 AIVs evolves faster than
that of waterfowl-origin viruses. Moreover, results showed that the evolution rate for the
H7 gene was faster during 1994–1996 than in subsequent years. The rapid evolution
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during 1994–1996 was mirrored by an 8–amino acid deletion in 1996 at positions 212–
219 in the HA1 protein. This deletion removes five of six consecutive amino acids in part
of the receptor binding site. These findings suggest that the H7 gene underwent rapid
adaptation in the receptor binding domain after introduction into domestic poultry.
Of interest, position 189 (H3 numbering; H7 numbering, 180) in the HA1 protein
was identified as being under positive selection pressure, and this site is located in the
receptor binding site for H7 IAVs (256). Extensive polymorphisms, representing six
distinct amino acids (A, D, I, N, S, and T), are present at position 189. A previous study
showed that propagation of human H1N1 influenza virus in embryonated chicken eggs
could cause the substitution E189K at the HA1 protein (257). R189K was found to have
contributed to the antigenic drift of H3N2 IAV (258), and position 189 plays an
important role for the antigenicity of H3 equine influenza virus (259). Another study
showed that single amino acid changes at position A186D (H3 numbering, 189) could
increase yield of A/California/7/09(H1N1) virus in eggs (260). Most influenza viruses
recovered from avian samples have been propagated by using chicken embryonated eggs,
and a previous study demonstrated frequent adaptation of H1N1 waterfowl-origin AIVs
during propagation in embryonated eggs (261). The receptors in chicken embryonated
eggs and those in the mallard gastrointestinal track are not exactly the same. In addition,
expression of sialic acids showed substantial host-specific distinctions among avian
species. Expression of α2,3-linked sialic acids and α2,6-linked sialic acids were observed
in chicken trachea, whereas α2,3-linked sialic acids were predominant in ducks (262,
263). Thus, it is possible that the polymorphisms and positive selection detected in
position 189 in the HA1 protein were due to viral propagation in embryonated eggs.
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Our phylogenetic analysis identified the 2-way intercontinental flow of the AIV
H7 gene through the migration of wild birds. At least two independent introductions (in
1992 and 1994) from the Eurasian genetic pool to the North American genetic pool were
identified. These introductions were not observed in earlier studies with smaller datasets
(264, 265). Early research detected a subtype H6 IAV in the United States with an HA
gene derived from the Eurasian gene pool; the virus subsequently caused an outbreak
among poultry in California during 2000–2002 (50). The introduced Eurasian H6 virus
has led to the replacement of the endemic H6 AIVs in North America. Recently,
outbreaks of novel HPAI H5 viruses have been detected in the United States and Canada.
These viruses originated from a wholly Eurasia-origin H5N8 virus introduced to North
America by migratory birds through Beringia in 2014 (266). Two novel reassortants
(H5N2 and H5N1) were generated by reassortments with viruses circulating in North
America. The Beringian Crucible, including Alaska and the Russian Far East, serves as a
common breeding area for diverse bird species from Asia and North America. This area
provides an ideal environment for reassortment between IAVs carried by migratory birds
from distinct gene pools, and it allows for the intercontinental transfer of gene segments
or whole virus. Gene flow increases the diversity in individual genetic pools, and
diversity could enhance the risk of generating novel strains that can spread more
efficiently among birds and even cross the species barrier and cause transmission to
mammals.
Our evolutionary analysis revealed frequent reassortment of six internal gene
segments of H7 AIVs in the NA-WB lineage; no clear link was identified for any specific
gene segment. The internal gene constellation was diverse and transient. This finding was
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concordant with those from a 2008 study conducted with a smaller dataset of AIVs and
without differentiating the HA subtype (48). However, our finding of a diverse and
transient gene constellation differed from the finding of a limited number of stable
internal gene cassettes for IAVs adapted to mammals. The eight gene segments of IAVs
could evolve differently due to different selection pressures. The evolution of the internal
gene segments may be determined by functional constraints rather than immune pressure
for the genes coded for the two surface proteins. In wild birds, internal protein genes are
highly conserved on the amino acid level, and they could form a large pool of
functionally equivalent gene segments. Such a pool would allow frequent reassortment
because the exchange of functionally equivalent gene segments is not likely to attenuate
the relative fitness of the reassorted viruses. For mammalian adapted IAVs, certain
internal gene constellations were suggested to confer a selective advantage to the virus
(227). Mutations may be acquired for internal genes after adaptation to a new host, and
those mutations would separate the viruses from those in the natural reservoir. The
protein–protein interaction could force the co-evolution of these gene segments and
maintain the existence of a specific internal gene constellation.
In summary, our findings demonstrate a limited antigenic diversity among
contemporary H7 avian-origin IAVs from North America. H7 IAVs from wild birds,
domestic poultry, and a seal, which together represent a diverse geographic and temporal
coverage, were included in this study. The limitation of this study was the small number
of H7N3 isolates from the ongoing AIV outbreak in Mexico. Additional studies on a
longitudinal collection of H7N3 viruses from the outbreak in Mexico would add to our
understanding of the influence vaccination programs have on genetic and antigenic
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evolutionary dynamics. LPAI H7N9 viruses are enzootic in China (234), but the antigenic
properties of these viruses have not been characterized. An antigenic comparison of H7
AIVs from the United State and those from outbreaks in other regions, including China
and Europe, is also lacking. Due to the possible transmission of H7 AIVs across regions
and continents, constant monitoring of emerging H7 AIVs in North America must
continue.
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CONCLUSIONS
The emergence of novel avian origin IAVs presents a continuous threat to animal
and public health. The objectives of this dissertation research are to infer the genesis of
two emerging avian origin IAVs, LPAI H10N8 and HPAI H7N8 viruses, and to
investigate the antigenic diversity and genetic evolution of H7 AIVs isolated from North
America over the past 40 years. The findings and contributions are concluded as
following.
First, a gradual increase in IAV prevalence and detection of H10 viruses was
observed in the LPM visited by the first patient infected with the novel H10N8 virus.
AIVs that are genetically close to the human H10N8 isolate were recovered from this
LPM. High seroprevalence of H10 virus was observed in chickens and ducks from five
LPMs in the city. These findings suggested that LPM is the most probable source of
human infection with this novel H10N8 virus, and this virus appears to present
throughout the LPM system in the city. These findings also highlight the role of LPMs in
the zoonotic transmission of AIVs and suggest that the existing influenza ecosystem in
Southern China could favor the emergence of novel IAVs that present potential risk to
animal and human health.
Second, the novel H7N8 virus most likely circulated among diving ducks in the
Mississippi flyway during autumn 2015 and was subsequently introduced to Indiana
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turkey, in which it evolved from LPAI into HPAI. H4N8 IAVs circulating among diving
duck possess a gene constellation comprising five H7N8–like gene segments (except PA,
HA, and NP, >98% sequence identity). Preceding the outbreak, an isolate with six gene
segments (except NP and MP) sharing >99% sequence identity with those of H7N8
turkey viruses was recovered from a diving duck. These findings suggest that viral gene
constellations circulating among diving ducks could contribute towards the emergence of
IAVs that can affect domestic poultry, and diving ducks may serve as the potentially
unique IAV reservoir or uniquely contribute to the maintenance, diversification, and
transmission of IAVs in wild birds. These findings also highlight the importance of
genomic sequencing and gene constellation characterization in wild bird IAV
surveillance.
Third, a gradual accumulation of nucleotide and amino acid substitutions in the
HA gene of H7 AIVs isolated from wild and domestic birds in North America has led to
wide genetic diversity. Limited antigenic diversity was observed among the 93 North
American contemporary H7 AIVs we tested. These findings suggested that continuous
genetic evolution has not led to significant antigenic diversity for contemporary H7 AIVs
from North America.
In summary, this dissertation study addresses the immediate public and animal
health problem presented by the emergence of two novel avian origin IAVs, LPAI
H10N8 and HPAI H7N8 viruses. In addition, it investigates the long-term antigenic and
genetic evolution of H7 AIVs from North America over the past 40 years. The findings in
this dissertation add to our knowledge of the natural history of IAVs and are critical for
formulation of effective disease prevention and control strategies.
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